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BOOK REVIEWS
LANI GUINIER AND THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. By Lani Guinier. New York: The
Free Press, 1994. Pp. xx, 324. $24.95.
Richard Briffault*
Lani Guinier, an experienced voting rights litigator and a professor
of law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, first came to national
attention in the spring of 1993 when President Clinton nominated her to
be assistant attorney general for civil rights. Labelled a "quota queen" by
the Wall StreetJournal,' Guinier became the target of a fervent campaign
to block her nomination.2 For several weeks, Guinier's law review articles
on voting rights were the focus of a fierce national debate. Politicians
and pundits expounded on her publications and spread snippets from
her scholarship across the front pages and opinion columns of America's
media. Although her writings and ideas received a volume of attention
that many academics would die for, the soundbite commentary generated
far more heat than light, with selective quotation, tendentious analysis,
and ideological3 and partisan concerns typically crowding out balanced
and dispassionate discussion.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Research for this Essay was
supported by the Walter E. Meyer Research in Law and Social Problems Fund.
1. Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. Bolick's
article assailed two "quota queens," Guinier and Norma Cantu, the Southwestern Regional
Counsel for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, who was
nominated to be assistant secretary for civil rights in the Department of Education. See id.
2. See, e.g., Bill Gifford, Journal Fever, Wash. Monthly, Nov. 1993, at 36 (describing
Wall Street Journal's "Borking" of Guinier); Linda R. Hirshman, If This Is the New
Republic, Madam, Then You Can Keep It, Tikkun, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 11, 13-14; Michael
Isikoff, Power Behind the Thrown Nominee: Activist with Score to Settle, Wash. Post,June
6, 1993, at All (campaign against Guinier portrayed as right-wing revenge for successful
liberal campaign to block nomination of Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court
and the unsuccessful attempt to block the Clarence Thomas nomination); Laurel Leff,
From Legal Scholar to Quota Queen: What Happens When Politics Pulls the Press into the
Groves of Academe, Colum. Journalism Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 36.
3. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Did Paper Trail Obscure the Real Guinier?, Am. Law.,
July-Aug. 1993, at 29 (Guinier was "ideological symbol and thus a target" of right-wing
opposition and victim of "gross caricaturing from impassioned opponents").
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As the Wall StreetJournal's insidious appellation took root,4 so, too,
did the perception of Guinier as an "extremist"5 who held views that were
"off the deep end,"6 "out of the mainstream," 7 and "alarmingly radical."8
With a potentially explosive Senate confirmation hearing in the offing,
President Clinton abruptly withdrew her nomination. In so doing, the
President not only denied her a nationally televised forum in which she
could respond to her attackers and defend her views, but added insult to
injury by appearing to agree with her critics. Guinier, Clinton stated,
"seem[s] to be arguing for principles ... that I think inappropriate as
general remedies and anti-democratic, [and] very difficult to defend."9
The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative De-
mocracy is a collection of Lani Guinier's previously published law review
articles-both the celebrated (or notorious) articles that figured so
prominently in the nomination furor and others submitted prior to, but
published after, the President withdrew her nomination' 0-edited for a
nonacademic audience and supplemented with an introductory essay.
With this book, Guinier endeavors to reopen the public debate cut short
4. See, e.g., Bob Cohn, Crowning a 'Quota Queen'?, Newsweek, May 24, 1993, at 67.
5. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, Confirmation Battle Looms over Guinier: Critics Target
"Extreme" Views in Law Review Articles by Justice Dept. Civil Rights Nominee, Wash. Post,
May 21, 1993, at A23; Jerry Seper, Guinier Backers, Foes Speak Out, Wash. Times, May 27,
1993, at Al (discussing several groups' opposition to Guinier because of her "extreme"
views).
6. Martin Schram, Nominee's Ideas Are Too Far off the Deep End, N.Y. Newsday, May
25, 1993, at 76.
7. W. John Moore, Why Guinier May Be a Hard Sell, 25 Nat'l J. 1297, 1297 (1993)
(noting concern of many Democrats that Guinier was out of mainstream).
8. Stuart Taylor, Divide and Conquer as a Way to Racial Unity?, Recorder, May 18,
1993, at 9; see also American Survey: The Worst of Months, Economist, May 29, 1993, at 27
(Guinier's "writings on voting-rights are radical"); A Legal Extremist, San Diego Union-
Trib., May 28, 1993, at B6; Abigail Thernstrom, Guinier Miss: Clinton's Civil Rights
Blooper, New Republic, June 14, 1993, at 16 (Guinier's views "radical"); Lally Weymouth,
Lani Guinier Radical Justice, Wash. Post, May 25, 1993, at A19.
9. President's Reading of Nominee's Work, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1993, at A18.
10. The articles that were the focus of debate in 1993 were the following: Keeping the
Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393 (1989) (ch. 2 of
Tyranny); The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077 (1991) (ch. 3 of Tyranny); No Two Seats: The
Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413 (1991) (ch. 4 of Tyranny). Articles
apparently written prior to Guinier's nomination but published after her withdrawal are
the following- Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1589 (1993) (originally presented at Texas Law Review
Symposium on Regulating the Electoral Process in Nov. 1992) (ch. 5 of Tyranny); The
Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 1135 (1993) (presented at Symposium on Redistricting in the 1990s: The
NewYork Example, held at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Apr. 1992) (incorporated
into ch. 5 of Tyranny); Lines in the Sand, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 315 (1993) (presented at
workshops in Mar. 1993) (ch. 6 of Tyranny).
The dust jacket of The Tyranny of the Majority states that until publication of this book,
Guinier's legal writings "appeared in obscure academic law journals." Presumably the
editors of those journals, and the academics who publish in them, will not be offended.
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by the President's withdrawal of her nomination, and to present her anal-
ysis of the problematic place of majority rule in achieving "democracy in
a heterogeneous society" (p. 19).
Are Lani Guinier's ideas "radical"? Are her proposals "anti-
democratic," as the President suggested? They are certainly radical in
some senses. She argues that legislative representatives ought to be
elected through a system of cumulative voting from multi-member dis-
tricts," rather than by plurality voting from single-member districts. She
also contends that in some states and localities, the standard voting pro-
cedure within legislatures-the requirement of a simple majority-ought.
to be replaced by rules that would give greater legislative power to
minorities.
Beyond her specific proposals, Guinier puts forward a radical redefi-
nition of majority rule. She argues that the majority-even one that
prevails in a free and fair political process in which the unsuccessful mi-
nority had an unfettered opportunity to participate and to make its case
to the voters-should not have plenary power over all matters that are
subject to legislative decision. 12 Instead, she would require the majority
to share power with the minority, with majority and minority "taking
turns" with respect to particular issues (p. 5). Although the majority
would enjoy the lion's share, the minority would also be assured some
victories (p. 92). Given the long association of majority rule with demo-
cratic self-government,13 it is easy to see how Guinier might be labelled
anti-democratic.
Yet, in another sense, there is nothing anti-democratic about any of
this; and Guinier's proposals seem radical only in a narrowly American
context. Although relatively unknown in political elections in the United
States,' 4 semiproportional and proportional representation systems are
11. See infra text accompanying notes 51-52 for an exploration of cumulative voting.
12. Guinier is not making the well-established claim that fundamental rights are not
subject to majoritarian determination. Rather, she is seeking to limit the power of the
majority to prevail with respect to the ordinary issues that come before a government (pp.
102-03).
13. See Philip Green, "Democracy" as a Contested Idea, in Democracy. Key Concepts
in Critical Theory 2, 12 (Philip Green ed., 1993) ("[M]ost democratic theorists properly
make majority rule the centerpiece of the democratic process.").
14. Members of the United States House of Representatives and most state legislators
are elected by plurality voting in single-member districts. See generally Douglas J. Amy,
Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the
United States 1-20 (1993) (discussing failings of American single-member plurality
system). Most local legislators are elected by plurality voting in either single-member
districts, multi-member elections, at-large elections, or a mix of these systems. See Tari
Renner, Municipal Election Processes: The Impact on Minority Representation, in The
Municipal Year Book 1988, at 13, 15 (International City Management Association ed.)
[hereinafter Year Book]. Cumulative voting has, however, played an important role in
corporate governance in the United States. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124, 142-46 (1994).
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the rule in most other democracies. 15 Similarly, there are "consensus"
democracies-democracies in which the majority limits itself, shares
power, and acts only after it has obtained the consent of the minority-as
well as majoritarian democracies.
16
Moreover, Guinier's concern with the capacity of a majority to abuse
its authority and oppress the minority resonates deeply with longstanding
themes in democratic political theory and the American constitutional
tradition. The concept of the "tyranny of the majority" was, John Stuart
Mill suggested, already a clich6 when he penned On Liberty in 1859.17 As
Robert Dahl has noted, a "preoccupation with the rights and wrongs of
majority rule has run like a red thread through American political
thought since 1789."18 Madison's celebrated concern with "the mischiefs
of faction" applied to majority, as well as minority, factions. The Framers
struggled to construct a constitution that would render "the majority...
unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression."19
Guinier's claim to a Madisonian pedigree is well-founded (pp. 3-4), even
if her specific concern with the potential of majority rule to deny political
equality to black Americans would have been beyond the ken of the slave-
holders who gathered at the Philadelphia Convention two centuries ago.
Tyranny combines a theoretical exploration of the tension between
majority rule and minority representation with a lawyerly examination of
questions of liability and remedy under the Voting Rights Act. The theo-
retical and the lawyerly are closely intertwined. Guinier sees the Voting
Rights Act as notjust a set of technical rules to protect the right of blacks
and other ethnic minorities to cast ballots but also as the embodiment of
a vision of political equality and political empowerment. Her critique of
the potential conflict between minority rights and majority rule infuses
her discussion of rights and remedies under the Act, much as she sees in
the Act a procedural road to "fundamental fairness in representative de-
mocracy." Her specific proposals concerning the election of representa-
tives and legislative voting are intended both to cure what she considers
to be the principal shortcomings in the current application of the Act
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahi, Democracy and Its Critics 157-59 (1989).
16. See Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus
Government in Twenty-One Countries 21-36, 60-66 (1984) (discussing practice in several
Western parliamentary systems of creating "oversized cabinets," i.e., including in the
government more parties than are strictly necessary to create a majority government, in
order to share power with minorities).
Typically, these are countries marked by sharp religious, ethnic, or ideological
division, in which consensus is necessary to maintain societal harmony. See Dahl, supra
note 15, at 157, 161.
17. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 7 (Bobbs-Merrill 1956) ("[I]n political
speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against
which society requires to be on its guard.").
18. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 4 (1956).
19. The Federalist No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
COLUMBIA LAW REIEW
and to implement her broader goal of more proportionate representa-
tion of minority political concerns within a democratic framework.
This Review has three parts. Part I summarizes Guinier's critique of
the traditional focus of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence: the election of
minority officeholders from single-member districts. Guinier argues that
the concentration on "black electoral success" (p. 42) has undermined
the effectiveness of the Act in achieving political equality and political
empowerment for minorities. Her attack on districting and her call for
cumulative voting, examined in Part II, raise the important question of
how to elect a truly democratic legislature. Guinier makes the case that
cumulative voting would enhance the representation of minorities in leg-
islatures with less of the divisiveness that districting entails. Although her
analysis would have been enhanced by a discussion of other methods of
electing representatives in addition to districting and cumulative voting,
Guinier has contributed significantly to broadening the contemporary
debate over the election of representatives.
20
Guinier's effort to apply the Voting Rights Act to legislative voting
rules, considered in Part III, is less successful. Her claim that her ap-
proach is a procedural reform, unconcerned with the substance of legisla-
tive outcomes, is not persuasive, and its implementation would risk a high
degree of outside interference with the operations of legislatures. Never-
theless, her concern with the fairness of majority rule in a polarized legis-
lature should not be summarily dismissed. As Guinier contends, the legit-
imacy of majority rule ultimately rests on the existence of an equal
opportunity for all members of the electorate to be in the majority. If,
due to a deep and lasting division between the majority and the minority,
some members of the polity are effectively denied the opportunity ever to
be in the majority, then majority rule can become majority tyranny.
Thus, although Guinier's proposal is unsatisfactory, the problem she ad-
dresses is a central dilemma of democratic theory.
I. GUINIER'S CRITIQUE OF "THE THEORY OF BLACK ELEcroRAL SuccEss"
The centerpiece of Guinier's Voting Rights Act analysis is her
thoughtful, often devastating, criticism of the focus of voting rightsjuris-
prudence on the election of minority candidates through single-member
districts. Her attack is particularly striking, and her intellectual integrity
impressive, in light of the extraordinary success voting rights litigators
have had in applying the Act to enhance the ability of blacks and other
minorities protected by the Act to elect the candidates they prefer. This
point resonates even more fully given her own background as a leading
20. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Fitting Designer Districts into Off-the-Rack
Democracy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1994, § 4, at 4.
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voting rights lawyer who had previously participated in the traditional ap-
proach she now appraises so critically.
2 '
First enacted in 1965, and subsequently amended and extended in
1970, 1975, and 1982, the Voting Rights Act protects members of racial
and language minorities from interference with the right to vote.2 2 In
the "first generation" of Voting Rights Act cases, both private litigation
and government enforcement actions under the Act focused primarily on
the elimination of formal barriers to electoral participation, such as liter-
acy tests and discriminatory registration practices (p. 7). When "South-
em states and local subdivisions responded to blacks in the electorate by
switching the way elections were conducted to ensure that newly voting
blacks could not wield any influence" (p. 7), Voting Rights Act litigation
began to target such "vote dilution" practices. The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Act applies to "vote dilution" as well as to restrictions af-
fecting the ability to cast ballots, 23 and in 1982, Congress amended the
Act to permit the use of an "effects" test to prove that certain electoral
practices constituted dilution.
2 4
21. The sequence of chapters in Tyranny reflects to some extent Guinier's evolution
from litigator to scholar and her development of the "theory of black electoral success." In
chapter 2, an edited version of an article published in 1989 shortly after she left practice,
she makes argtLments in favor of the importance of the election of black officials (pp.
33-37) that she attacks in chapters 3, 4, and 5, which are based on articles published in
1991 and 1993.
22. Section 2 of the Act prohibits any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure.., which results in a denial or abridgement" of the right
to vote on grounds of race or membership in a language minority. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)
(1988).
Section 5 provides that certain states and political subdivisions can enforce changes in
voting qualifications, standards, practices, or procedures only after they have obtained
federal preclearance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). A public subdivision becomes a so-
called covered jurisdiction subject to the preclearance requirement if (i) fewer than fifty
percent of its voting age residents voted in the presidential elections of 1964, 1968, and
1972, and (ii) the jurisdiction utilized a forbidden "test or device" as a prerequisite to
voting. See id. Covered jurisdictions may obtain preclearance by either (i) securing a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that
the changes "do(] not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote;" or (ii) submitting the changes to the Attorney General of the
United States, who, utilizing the same criteria as the district court, can block the
effectuation of the proposed change. See id. If the Attorney General does not act within a
specified time period, the change may take effect. In practice, the vast majority of
preclearances go through the Attorney General process.
23. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
24. As a result of the 1982 amendment, the Act provides that a violation is established
"if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election.., are not equally open to participation" by members of minority
groups protected by the Act, and that "[t]he extent to which members" of the minority
"have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be considered" in
determining whether a state or local standard, practice, or procedure violates the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
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The 1982 amendment facilitated the mounting of vote dilution chal-
lenges not only to practices adopted in response to the enfranchisement
of blacks but also to pre-existing practices that make it difficult for minor-
ity groups to succeed in the political process. At-large elections and
multi-member districts-which enable one jurisdiction-wide majority to
dominate the voting for each legislative seat, and thus, in a racially po-
larized setting, deny minority voters the ability to elect their own repre-
sentatives-have been a frequent target of vote dilution suits. As a result
of this "second generation" of Voting Rights Act claims, such electoral
systems have been invalidated in many states and localities and have been
replaced with single-member district systems in which racial minority vot-
ers constitute a political majority in some districts and, thus, are able to
elect some representatives.25 This shift has contributed to a significant
increase in the number of minority elected officials.26
In Guinier's eyes, however, this success was purchased at a great
price. Guinier argues that the Voting Rights Act was inspired by the
"transformative and inclusionary vision" (p. 41) of the civil rights move-
ment, which saw in the right to vote the key to political equality and polit-
ical empowerment for blacks. The Act was intended to initiate a process
of political mobilization, grass roots organization, articulation of a black
social and economic agenda, and ultimately, achievement of "effective
social change" (p. 44). But this broad vision of empowerment has been
supplanted by a narrow definition of political equality in terms of the
election of black officials-what Guinier dubs "the theory of black
electoral success" (p. 42).
Guinier places part of the blame for this development on the practi-
cal imperatives of litigation. As she notes, voting rights lawyers and sym-
pathetic judges engaged in "the predictable search.., for a justiciable
formula, ostensibly structured around a central, measurable factor" (p.
50). She lucidly describes how voting rights litigation came to emphasize
two "judicially manageable" questions: the existence of racially polarized
voting and the electoral success of minority candidates (p. 52). Vote dilu-
tion litigation became largely statistical, with a focus on the existence of
25. The Voting Rights Act litigation has greatly reduced the use of multi-member
districts in the election of state legislators. See Charles S. Bullock III & Ronald K. Gaddie,
Changing from Multimember to Single-Member Districts: Partisan, Racial, and Gender
Consequences, 25 State & Loc. Gov't Rev. 155, 155 (1993) ("Persistent attacks by the U.S.
Attorney General and private plaintiffs ... have made the MMD an endangered entity.").
Vote dilution litigation has had a less sweeping effect on the structure of local
governments, although it has significantly reduced the number of at-large elections,
particularly in the South. See Renner, supra note 14, at 13, 16.
The Voting Rights Act also applies to single-member districting plans that deny or
reduce the ability of minority voters to elect a fair number of representatives. See, e.g.,
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993).
26. See Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 Legis. Stud. Q. 111, 112 (1991)
(attributing dramatic increase in number of black legislators in Southern states to use of
Voting Rights Act to create more black-majority districts).
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very sharp divisions in majority and minority voting patterns, the refusal
of white voters to vote for minority candidates, and the effect of such
polarized voting on the ability of minority voters to elect their preferred
candidates.
Although Guinier is critical of this litigation strategy, the "quantifi-
able" approach did offer some benefits. It is likely to be cheaper and
easier to litigate disparities in voting patterns than the "totality of the cir-
cumstances."27 Racial polarization and the extent of minority electoral
success are far more determinate issues than the "responsiveness" of a
state or local government to minority electoral concerns.28 But, in her
view, the tendency to define political equality exclusively in terms of the
election of black representatives, and the accompanying drive to achieve
single-member districting as the preferred mode of election, "eclipsed
the [civil rights] movement's wide-angled focus on transformative poli-
tics" (p. 43). More black officials have been elected, but "issues of voter
participation, effective representation, and policy responsiveness [were]
omitted from the calculus" (p. 49).,
Indeed, Guinier suggests, the exclusive focus on "black electoral suc-
cess" and the pursuit of single-member districting as the route to that
success may, paradoxically, have undermined broader empowerment and
equality goals (pp. 54-69). Not all "descriptively" black officials (p. 56)
will seek to advance the political agenda supported by most black people.
Black officials need not share the policy preferences held by most
blacks.29 Black candidates elected by predominantly white constituencies
will not be accountable to the preferences of the black electorate. Even
the election of black candidates from black communities may not em-
power black voters since black officeholders-like white officeholders-
may place personal advancement ahead of the interests of their constitu-
ents (pp. 62, 67).
Nor does the election of black candidates necessarily increase the
political participation of the black community. Although the excitement
of an election campaign in which a black candidate is making the first
serious bid to win an office previously held by whites can generate high
levels of black grass-roots involvement and voter turnout, the mobiliza-
tion rarely lasts past election day and political participation frequently
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
28. Guinier acknowledges that the "unresponsiveness" of the local political process to
black concerns "was elusive as an evidentiary tool and almost as difficult and divisive as
proving discriminatory purpose" (p. 50). So, too, she agrees that the doctrinal focus on
racial bloc voting "had theoretical appeal" (p. 51). Indeed, throughout her work racial
polarization is the essential premisejustifying closer examination of local political practices
and procedures.
29. Cf. Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African
Americans in Congress 212-13 (1993) (stating that Gary Franks, the only black Republican
representative in Congress when Swain conducted her study, tends to vote with white
Republicans rather than black Democrats on policy issues of significance to blacks).
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drops once the black candidate has been transformed from a challenger
to an incumbent (pp. 68, 85).
Moreover, the election of black candidates may fail to empower
black voters if the racial polarization of the electorate is "reproduce [d]"
in the legislature (p. 65). The "theory of black electoral success" assumes
minority officials can be effective legislators despite the existence of racial
polarization in the community. This presumes that white legislators are
less prejudiced than white voters generally; that whatever their
prejudices, elected officials will be "professional" and will work together;
or that as white and black officials deal with each other their prejudices
will abate and their relations will be marked by ordinary legislative norms
of logrolling and reciprocity.
But, Guinier contends, prejudice may persist within the legislature.
Black representatives may be "isolated" or "ignored" (pp. 63-64, 80), par-
ticularly when there is but a single minority representative, when the leg-
islature is small, or when it lacks formal structures, such as the committee
system and seniority, which give minority officials institutional clout. Po-
larization and the de facto isolation of racial minorities within the legisla-
ture are, thus, more likely to occur at the local level, where legislatures
are small, informal, and less professionalized, than in Congress. In
smaller, polarized localities, the election of a minority representative may
merely "transfer[ ] the discrete and insular minority problem from the
electorate to the legislative body" (p. 117).
Guinier is critical of "the theory of black electoral success," but she
clearly supports the use of the Voting Rights Act to eliminate structural
obstacles to the election of black officials.30 Some critics have attacked
the focus on the election of minority representatives as excessively race-
conscious. And surely white elected officials can effectively champion mi-
nority concerns and attend to the needs and views of minority constitu-
ents.3 1 Yet there is also a need to scrutinize rules that make it difficult for
minorities to elect the candidates they prefer. The election of officials is
a recognized step in the incorporation of historically excluded groups
into political life and in the public recognition of the group's equal mem-
bership in a democratic society.3 2 "Descriptive" representation may fall
short of "substantive" representation, but the notion of the legislature as
a mirror of the community-what John Adams referred to as "an exact
portrait, in miniature, of the people at large"-has deep roots in our poli-
30. As she observes, the election of blacks "affirms the status of blacks as full citizens
who can not only vote but can also hold elective office" (p. 217 n.96). The inability of
blacks to elect their own candidates could be seen as both "the symptom and cause of black
political inequality" (p. 52).
31. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2597-99 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and
Minority Voting Rights 225-26 (1987).
32. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality:. An Essay in Democratic Theory 109-10
(1989).
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tics and in our definition of representation. 3 A legislature without repre-
sentatives from a politically significant group is a cracked mirror and an
inaccurate portrait.
Guinier's real targets are districting and the tendency to treat the
election of black officials as the final goal rather than as just a step toward
political equality and political empowerment. Guinier makes two propos-
als for overcoming the shortcomings of the "theory of black electoral suc-
cess" and restoring the original "transformative vision" of the Act. First,
she would abandon the pursuit of single-member districts and, instead,
elect legislators by cumulative voting. Second, she would apply the Vot-
ing Rights Act to legislative voting rules, such as majority voting, that en-
33. See Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60-61, 142 (1967). In Pitkin's
terminology, in "descriptive" representation the representative body "stands for" the
people represented, "by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a
resemblance or reflection. In political terms, what seems important is less what the
legislature does than how it is composed." Id. at 61. The legitimacy of government by
representatives, then, turns on the representatives being "like" the community
represented. The concept of descriptive representation is at the root of the argument for
proportional representation. See id. at 61-62. "Substantive" representation, in contrast,
focuses on what the representative does-on tle representative's "acting for" the
constituency, not the representative's resemblance to the constituency. "In the realm of
action, the representative's characteristics are relevant only insofar as they affect what he
does." Id. at 142.
The relationship between "descriptive" and "substantive" representation is uncertain.
The jurisprudence of the Voting Rights Act tends to treat the two concepts as closely
linked, with greater "descriptive" representation of protected minorities seen as necessary
if proper "substantive" representation of their interests is to be obtained. Some critics have
argued that "descriptive" representation is not necessary for "substantive" representation,
and indeed, may be counterproductive. As Justice Thomas recently contended, "it is
certainly possible to construct a theory of effective political participation that would accord
greater importance to voters' ability to influence, rather than control, elections." Holder,
114 S. Ct. at 2595-96. In this view, minority interests might win greater substantive
representation if minority voters are a "potential 'swing' group," id. at 2596, able to
influence the outcome in a number of electoral contests, rather than if they are given
outright control over a smaller number of seats. The contest between the "influence" and
"control" theories of representation turns on the nature and severity of the political
divisions within a community and whether the minority is politically situated between
different majority factions, so- that it is plausible to assume that the minority could, in fact,
function as a swing group. Moreover, this argument for greater "substantive"
representation of minorities through "swing" or "influence" districts misses the
independent significance of greater minority electoral success. "[T]o the extent that
effective governing is directly related to the level of confidence that the governed have in
the governors, the public interest is no doubt advanced when minorities can more closely
and tangibly identify with their elected officials." Gary J. Jacobsohn, Political
Incorporation and Democratic Theory, in Reconsidering the Democratic Public 417, 425
(George E. Marcus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993).
Guinier also questions the linkage between "descriptive" and "substantive"
representation. Although she sees the Voting Rights Act as promoting both the
"descriptive" and the "substantive" representation of protected minorities (pp. 33-35), she
suggests that due to the theory of "black electoral success," the goal of descriptive
representation has tended to overshadow if not supplant the goal of substantive
representation (pp. 54-58).
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able a legislative majority to ignore the representatives of the minorities
protected by the Act.
II. THE ELECTION OF A DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATURE
Guinier's attack on districting opens up a question central for any
representative democracy: how ought the legislature be elected? In the
United States, federal law requires that members of the House of Repre-
sentatives be elected from single-member districts.3 4 Most state legisla-
tors and many local legislators are elected in single-member districts.
The Supreme Court has held that when federal district courts impose
redistricting plans they must prefer single-member districts over multi-
member systems.35 As one critic of single-member district elections re-
cently observed, "[mlost Americans consider this the most common and
natural way to elect officials. We assume that this system is the epitome of
democracy and a model for the rest of the free world."
36
But single-member districts are not the only way to elect a demo-
cratic legislature. Most democratic countries, and virtually all non-Eng-
lish-speaking democracies, use some form of semi-proportional or pro-
portional representation that requires multi-member districts.37 Within
the United States, a handful of jurisdictions have experimented with al-
ternatives to single-member districts and plurality elections.38 Recently,
voting rights litigators have begun to look to alternatives to districting in
places where minority voters are residentially dispersed and where, there-
fore, it is difficult to create districts that the minority can control.
3 9
34. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1988).
35. See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978); accord Connor v. Johnson, 402
U.S. 690, 692 (1971).
36. Amy, supra note 14, at 1.
The intuitive assumption that representative democracy entails the use of single-
member districts and plurality elections no doubt contributed to the ability of the vote
dilution doctrine to invalidate at-large elections and multi-member districts. "Dilution"
suggests a watering down from full strength, and implicitly, the existence of a "benchmark"
of undiluted representation against which the diluted vote can be compared. See Holder,
114 S. Ct. at 2585 (1994) (in a "vote dilution suit... a court must find a reasonable
alternative practice as a benchmark against which to measure the existing voting
practice"). The assumption that single-member districts are the democratic norm in
legislative elections provided the benchmark in those cases. So, too, the absence of any
generally accepted "benchmark" for the size of a legislative body doomed the vote dilution
attack on a one-member county commission in Holder v. Hall. See id. at 2586.
37. See, e.g., Amy, supra note 14, at 2; Lijphart, supra note 16, at 152.
38. See Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of Proportional
Representation in Local Governments in the United States, in Electoral Laws and their
Political Consequences 139, 139-53 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986)
[hereinafter Grofman & Lijphart, Electoral Laws]; Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and
Proportional Representation Systems in the United States, in Choosing an Electoral
System: Issues and Alternatives 191, 191-206 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1984) [hereinafter Lijphart & Grofmaan, Electoral System].
39. See Richard Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems as Remedies for
Minority Vote Dilution, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 743, 752-57 (1992); Richard Engstrom et al.,
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Guinier's proposal to replace districting is, thus, not entirely novel.
Nevertheless, a signal accomplishment of Guinier's work-through both
the uninvited controversy over her nomination and the intentional effort
to reach a wider, nonacademic public with her views through the publica-
tion of The Tyranny of the Majority-may be to make more Americans
aware that there is more than one way to elect a democratic legislature.
Guinier, however, focuses her efforts on one particular alternative to dis-
tricting-cumulative voting. Her analysis would have been enhanced by
an examination of other methods of election that could also promote a
more representative legislature.
This Part summarizes Guinier's critique of districting, examines her
argument for cumulative voting, and then considers another alternative
to districting. It concludes with a discussion of some of the general crite-
ria that come into play in determining the method of election-which
interests ought to be represented, and how the representativeness of the
legislature affects its capacity to take decisive action-and an analysis of
how those criteria ought to shape the debate over the selection of a dem-
ocratic legislature.
A. Districting and Its Discontents
Guinier's indictment of districting has two counts: First, as a matter
of minority representation, districting contributes to the divergence be-
tween electoral success and empowerment. Second, as a more general
theoretical matter, districting empowers those who draw district lines to
affect electoral outcomes and privileges territorial interests over other
interests.
1. Districting and Minority Representation. - As Guinier notes, district-
ing under the Voting Rights Act encourages the creation of minority
"safe" seats and noncompetitive districts (p. 85).40 By making representa-
tives confident of reelection, noncompetitive districts may also make
Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New
Mexico, 5J.L. & Pol. 469, 472 (1989); Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts,
in Minority Vote Dilution 249, 249-67 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
40. Current practice under the Voting Rights Act favors the creation of districts with
supermajorities of black voters. This is due to the assumption of many courts and voting
rights lawyers that to assure that a racial minority actually constitutes a voting majority
within the district, the district's population must be at least 65% minority. See Ketchum v.
Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining derivation of 65% as a standard
for minority electoral effectiveness), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). The concern that
a supermajority is necessary for effective controls stems from differences in the proportion
of white and minority populations old enough to vote and from traditional differences in
registration and turnout. There is some evidence that the 65% rule overstates the
percentage necessary to give the minority effective control. See Kimball Brace et al.,
Minority Voting Equality- The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 Law & Pol'y 43,
48-53 (1988). Nevertheless, the 65% rule remains powerful and continues to favor the
creation of overwhelmingly black districts. In these districts, black candidates may face
little effective opposition from white challengers. As a result, at least in the House of
Representatives, most black incumbents "almost always get reelected." Swain, supra note
429
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those representatives less responsive to their constituents (p. 100),41 and
depress voter participation in the political process. 42
Moreover, districting may contribute to the isolation of minority offi-
cials in the legislature. Districting plans that concentrate minority voters
in one district to assure the election of a minority representative necessar-
ily remove those voters from other districts. This reduces whatever influ-
ence the minority had on the representatives elected from those other
districts and gives representatives from those districts less incentive to be
attentive to minority concerns. Indeed, by pulling minority voters from
those areas, districting can change the balance of power in non-minority
districts and reduce the political prospects of white candidates sympa-
thetic to minority concerns (p. 135). 4 3 In some places, the switch from
multi-member to single-member districts has facilitated the election of
conservative white Republicans as well as blacks. 44 Given that white Dem-
ocrats are more likely than white Republicans to support black policy
preferences,45 districting could increase minority presence in state and
local legislatures while undermining minority political effectiveness.
Apart from the tension Guinier has traced between "black electoral
success" and effective political empowerment, districting is increasingly a
problematic device for even the election of minority representatives. Dis-
tricting will be effective only in areas where minority voters are residen-
tially concentrated in homogeneous territories so that majority-minority
districts can be created. Where minorities are residentially scattered or
where different racial and ethnic groups are interspersed it will be diffi-
cult to create majority-minority districts. The Supreme Court's decision
29, at 31, 66. But cf. id. at 73 ("no congressional district is truly safe" and some black
incumbents in heavily black districts have been ousted by black challengers).
41. As Carol Swain has observed, representatives with such "electoral security" tend to
"become complacent, not consulting their constituents as frequently as representatives
from other kinds of districts do." They are more likely to view themselves as "trustees,"
capable of deciding by themselves what is in the best interests of their communities, rather
than as "delegates" for "interests to be derived" from their constituents. Swain, supra note
29, at 72-73.
42. As a study of the impact of districting on Latino electoral participation found, the
creation of majority-minority districts "may have the unintended effect of distancing all but
the most committed voters from elections even while they assure that Latinos (and African
Americans) are elected to office." Rodolfo de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby,
Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen
Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1479, 1516 (1993).
43. This is compounded by the 65% rule, see supra note 40, which tends to pack
minority voters into overwhelmingly minority districts and minimizes the number of
minority voters available to affect the outcomes in white districts.
44. See Bullock & Gaddie, supra note 25, at 155-56, 161-63; Michael Oreskes,
Seeking Seats, Republicans Find Ally in Rights Act, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1990, at All. But
see Steven A. Holmes, Civil Rights Group Disputes Election Analyses on Black Districts,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at A15 (NAACP Legal Defense Fund rebuts argument that
creation of a significant number of black-majority congressional districts in South after
1990 was major contributing factor in Republican congressional victories in 1994).
45. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 29, at 13-19.
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in Shaw v. Reno,46 reflects and reinforces the difficulty of crafting black
majority districts where the black population is relatively dispersed. Shaw
considered a North Carolina congressional districting plan containing
"boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape"4 7 drawn to create a black
majority district by linking up concentrations of black population from a
number of different areas of the state. The Court held that such a plan
would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and could be invalidated as an
"unconstitutional racial gerrymander."48
2. Districting and the Theory of Representation. - Districting affects
electoral outcomes. As Guinier points out, districting empowers non-vot-
ers-incumbent politicians, a federal court, a districting commission-to
determine which interests will count in the election of representatives (p.
121).49 Moreover, the basic premise of districting is that the voters' prin-
cipal interest is territorial-that voters from different areas have different
and distinctive interests, and that those place-based interests are the ones
that ought to be guaranteed representation in the legislature. With dis-
tricting, the interests represented in the legislature are those that are suf-
ficiently territorially concentrated that they can command an electoral
majority in at least one district. An interest shared by a significant frac-
tion of the voters may fail to win representation if. those voters are dis-
persed throughout the jurisdiction but fail to constitute a majority in any
one district.
Districting also assumes a significant commonality of interest within
individual districts. A successful candidate can represent the losers who
voted for her opponents only on the assumption that there is a suffi-
ciently great community of interest within a district that the fact of shared
district residence outweighs the other electoral factors that led the losing
voters to vote for other candidates. But if there are deep political divi-
sions in the district, the interests of losers may not be represented by their
representatives. In a polity with many deeply divided districts-when, for
example, a non-place-based interest cuts across many districts-a signifi-
46. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
47. Id. at 2820.
48. Id. Relying on Shaw, federal three-judge courts have invalidated congressional
redistricting plans in three states. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga.
1994), stay granted andjuris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995); Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp.
119 (W.D. La. 1994), stay granted andjuris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994); Vera v. Richards,
861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994). A three-judge court sustained the redistricting plan at
issue in Shaw itself, finding that the plan was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
interest of obtaining preclearance from the Department ofJustice under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
49. As Robert Dixon has explained, "all districting is gerrymandering." "Whether or
not there is a gerrymander in design, there normally will be some gerrymander in result as
a concomitant of all district systems of legislative election." Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics 462 (1968).
Guinier refers to electoral districts as "compulsory constituencies" to underscore her
point that districts are constituencies forced on the voters by the authors of the districting
plan and not electoral units chosen by the voters themselves (p. 129).
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cant portion of the voters in each district, and, therefore, of the polity as
a whole, may feel unrepresented by their representatives.50
B. Alternatives to Districting
1. Guinier's Preferred Method of Election-Cumulative Voting. - Cumu-
lative voting entails multi-member districts but constrains the
majoritarian tendency of multi-member elections by giving the voter the
option either to cast one vote for each position to be filled or to cumulate
her votes in support of the candidate she most intensely prefers. If there
are three seats to be filled, a voter could cast one vote for each of three
candidates, or three votes for the one candidate who is her first choice. 51
By lifting the constraint of one vote per candidate, cumulative voting en-
ables a group of voters to concentrate their strength to increase their
opportunity to elect their most preferred candidates. If a minority is
large enough relative to the number of seats to be filled, then the minor-
ity's preferred candidate can win a seat even if that candidate receives no
votes from the majority's voters. Thus, cumulative voting can provide a
minority group with an opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice with-
out setting aside a particular seat for the group.5 2
For Guinier, much of the strategic and theoretical appeal of cumula-
tive voting derives from the fact that it dispenses with districts. Eliminat-
ing districts, by definition, eliminates the noncompetitive districts that, in
Guinier's view, make representatives less responsive to their constituents
and voters less interested in political participation (p. 96). Similarly,
without districting, voters of different races cannot be separated into dif-
ferent districts. Candidates would have the opportunity to campaign ju-
50. In Guinier's view, when voters are "represented" in the legislature by candidates
whom they opposed, that is "virtual representation," and not real representation (p. 130).
For a discussion of the argument for territorially based districts, see infra text
accompanying notes 76-81.
51. The voter could also, presumably, cast one vote for one candidate and two votes
for another.
52. Cumulative voting relies on the concept of the threshold of exclusion, that is, the
percentage of the vote a well-organized minority needs to win a seat even in the face of the
unanimous opposition of the majority. The threshold of exclusion for cumulative voting is
1/(1+N) + 1, where N is the number of seats to be filled. With a five-member city council, a
minority group's candidate is assured of a seat in a cumulative voting election if the group
casts one vote more than 1/(1+5), or one vote more than one-sixth, of the total vote.
For example, in a city with 1,000 votes, a minority with 167 votes can win one of the
five council seats even if none of the other 833 voters cast a single vote for the minority's
candidate, provided that all 167 minority voters cast all five of their votes for the minority's
candidate. That candidate would receive 835 (167 x 5) votes. The 833 majority voters
would cast 4165 (833 x 5) votes. If those votes were spread evenly overjust five candidates,
no one candidate backed by the majority would receive as many as the 835 votes of the
minority-preferred candidate, and the minority-preferred candidate would squeeze by. If
the majority group gave more of its votes to its top four candidates, those candidates would
outpoll the minority's candidate, but there would be fewer votes of the majority group
available for the majority's fifth candidate, thereby assuring that the minority-preferred
candidate would outpoll the fifth-place majority-preferred candidate and win a seat.
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risdiction-wide,5 3 instead of being confined to ethnically homogeneous
districts, and thus would have an incentive to appeal to different racial
groups and build "cross-racial coalitions" (p. 16). By reducing political
polarization, cumulative voting could also advance minority political ef-
fectiveness within the legislature.
More generally, without districts, there may be fewer voters who are
electoral losers. Under cumulative voting, voters who might have been
part of a small minority within one district would be able to join their
votes to those of residents of other districts. This can be of particular
benefit to minorities in Shaw v. Reno situations, where, due to residential
dispersal, it might not be possible to create a majority-minority jurisdic-
tion. With cumulative voting and a large enough group, the minority can
win a seat. There will still be losers, of course, since some electoral inter-
ests will be too small to surmount the threshold of exclusion, 54 but cumu-
lative voting lowers that threshold.
Moreover, without districting, no outside force picks winners and
losers, determines which groups will be represented in the legislature, or
decides which interests and issues will be the focus of local politics. 5 5
53. Guinier appears to assume that cumulative voting would be used on ajurisdiction-
wide basis; that is, that all representatives would be elected in one jurisdiction-wide
constituency. That has been the practice in the recent cases in which cumulative voting
has been adopted as a remedy for illegal vote dilution, but these cases involved local
governments and small legislatures. If cumulative voting were used in large city councils or
in the election of state legislatures, it is unlikely that the entire city or state would be one
voting district. More likely, the city or state would be divided into multi-member districts.
Indeed, in the one major use of cumulative voting in American political history, the
election of members of the lower house of the Illinois legislature between 1870 and 1980,
the state was divided into 59 three-member districts. Nevertheless, cumulative voting
would still increase the possibility of cross-racial alliances simply by virtue of larger,
potentially more integrated, multi-member districts.
54. The degree to which cumulative voting-or, indeed, any semiproportional or
proportional representation system-provides for the representation of minorities is
strongly affected by the number of seats to be filled from the district. If, for example, a
district has only three seats, it is unlikely to provide much representation for smaller
minorities. Taagepera and Shugart refer to the number of seats filled from a district as
"district magnitude" and claim it is a "decisive factor" in determining the
representativeness of an electoral system. See Rein Taagepera & Matthew S. Shugart, Seats
& Votes: The Effects & Determinants of Electoral Systems 112 (1989).
55. To be sure, those who design a cumulative voting system can seek to manipulate
the outcome through the determination of the number of seats to be filled by election
from a district orjurisdiction. See id. at 19-20, 112-25. The more seats to be filled, the
more likely each party or electoral group is to win a share of seats proportionate to its
share of votes, and the more likely smaller groups will win seats.
Similarly, cumulative voting is unlikely to dispense with some territorial districting
completely, particularly in larger polities or in polities with large legislatures. A city with a
five-, seven-, or nine-member council might choose to fill all the seats with a jurisdiction-
wide cumulative vote. But if a city with a larger legislative body-such as New York City,
which has a 51-member council-or a state were to adopt cumulative voting, it is likely that
the cumulative voting would occur within territorial districts, albeit within districts that are
larger than the current single-member districts. In such a system, there would remain
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Rather than having a district map create constituencies, cumulative vot-
ing "permits voters to self-select their identities" (p. 16). In particular,
cumulative voting does not presume that voters' principal interests are
place-based. Instead, it permits the formation of "voluntary interest con-
stituencies," that is, the interests that the voters themselves deem to be
relevant for local politics (pp. 100-01).
Finally, cumulative voting is "emphatically not racially based" (p. 15).
Any group of voters-feminists, environmentalists, the religious right-
can use it, not just blacks. It will be particularly advantageous for minori-
ties that are not geographically concentrated. Indeed, the principal ben-
eficiaries may not be blacks-who, in many parts of the country, have had
to contend with significant residential racial segregation 56-but other,
more residentially dispersed groups. Similarly, by eliminating race-
conscious line-drawing and the attendant charges of "ugly" districts and
"racial gerrymandering,"5 7 cumulative voting avoids the assertion fre-
quently levelled at race-conscious districting: that it reinforces a race-con-
scious approach to politics and inappropriately presumes that racial iden-
tity determines political perspective.
In light of the "quota queen" charges hurled at Guinier, it is worth
noting that the one thing that cumulative voting does not do is set aside a
quota of seats for blacks or any other ethnic group.58 Indeed, district-
ing-the system Guinier would supplant-is far more likely to function
as a "quota" system, since those who draw district maps are well aware of
demographic data and know which districts are dominated by which eth-
nic or partisan groups. If a map creates a district with a significant black
majority, it is very likely that a black candidate will win the district's seat.59
But cumulative voting does not assign any seat to any particular group.
There will be a black seat only if black voters see their political identity
primarily in terms of race-and do not divide themselves according to
income, class, ideology or other factors-and only if they organize them-
selves to use cumulative voting in terms of their interest as a racial group.
Cumulative voting makes it easier in general for jurisdiction-wide minori-
ties to win seats, but it does not reserve any particular seat for any particu-
lar minority.
opportunities for manipulation through both the mapping of districts and the
determination of the number of seats to be filled by cumulative voting within districts.
56. See Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and
the Making of the Underclass 60-82 (1993).
57. See Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly- An Inquiry into the Problem of
Racial Gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 652, 652-53 (1993).
58. A particularly egregious mischaracterization of Guinier's views occurred in Carol
M. Swain, Black-Majority Districts: A Bad Idea, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1993, at A23. Swain
criticized Guinier for her "continued emphasis on segregating black voters in black-
majority districts" even though at the heart of Guinier's argument is an unmistakable
hostility to "segregating black voters in black-majority districts."
59. See Swain, supra note 29, at 170 (noting that as of 1991, all black majority
congressional districts were represented by blacks).
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2. Beyond Cumulative Voting: Other Alternatives to Districting. - Given
her argument that "proportionate interest representation" is the touch-
stone of electoral fairness, it is surprising that Guinier does not mention
any of the forms of proportional representation common in other West-
ern countries and used in American cities earlier in this century. To be
sure, the most common form of proportional representation used by
Western democracies today-the party list system 6 0-presumes a degree
of party cohesion and partisanship alien to the American experience, and
is particularly inapposite in American local elections, which are often
nonpartisan or occur in localities dominated by one party. Party-list rep-
resentation might do little to increase the representation of minorities
not based on parties, such as racial and ethnic groups, and party-list rep-
resentation could be criticized, as Guinier has criticized districting, as a
form of "compulsory constituencies" that forces voters to organize their
political participation and political identification around parties.
But there is another form of proportional representation, known as
single transferable voting (STV), which is well-suited to a nonpartisan set-
ting, and would enhance the proportionate representation of minority
interests, would allow voters to form their own constituencies, and in gen-
eral, would appear likely to perform at least as well as cumulative voting
in achieving Guinier's goals.
61
Like cumulative voting, STV dispenses with single-member district-
ing and returns to multi-member districts or at-large elections. But in-
stead of allowing voters to cumulate votes behind one candidate, STV
provides a preference voting system. The voter casts one ballot but can
rank candidates to reflect the voter's relative preferences among them.
Ranking candidates in order of preference enables votes that would be
"wasted" on one candidate to be transferred to another candidate. A vote
can be "wasted" if it is "surplus"-that is, a vote cast for a candidate who
60. See Amy, supra note 14, at 15. In party list systems, voters vote for parties. In the
most extreme version-a "closed list" system-each party determines the order in which its
candidates are listed on the ballot. Voters may cast ballots only for the party as a whole.
The party's share of the vote determines how many seats it obtains, and its ranking of
candidates determines which of its candidates are elected. In "open list" systems, voters
can indicate their preferences among candidates on the party's list. "Candidates who
receive more individual votes are moved higher on the lists and thus have a better chance
of being elected." Id. app. A at 227-28.
61. Approximately two dozen cities utilized STV in local elections between 1915 and
about 1950, including New York City and Cincinnati, although only Cambridge,
Massachusetts and the New York City community school board system use it today, see id.
at 10-11, 18, 185. STV is used in some foreign countries, see id. at 18 (Ireland, Australia,
and Malta), although, as previously noted, the principal form of proportional
representation is the party-list system.
Although STV has only rarely been implemented, it has an illustrious pedigree. First
proposed by Thomas Hare in 1859, it was embraced by John Stuart Mill in the latter's
Considerations on Representative Government in 1862 as the ideal system for representative
elections. See John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government 148-68
(Prometheus Books 1991) (1862); see also Taagepera & Shugart, supra note 54, at 47-48.
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would win without it-or if it is cast for a losing candidate. STV saves
"wasted" votes by providing for their transfer to the next ranked candi-
date on a voter's ballot. STV thus increases the proportion of voters who
vote for a winning candidate, and increases the likelihood that the voter
will be represented by a legislator of his or her choosing.
The vote-transfer feature of STV benefits electoral minorities, even
in the face of the firm opposition of the majority.62 In ajurisdiction with
a five-seat legislature, a candidate with slightly more than one-sixth of the
vote will be able to win a seat under either a cumulative voting or STV
electoral system. 63 But STV would appear to be superior to cumulative
voting in achieving many of Guinier's goals: (a) the representation of
minority groups in proportion to their numbers; (b) the representation
of the greatest diversity of viewpoints; (c) more competitive elections; and
(d) the creation of cross-racial alliances.
(a) STV and proportional representation. - STV may be more likely
than cumulative voting to assure a minority group representation in pro-
portion to its votes. Cumulative voting works best when a group focuses
its votes on one candidate. If there are two or more minority candidates,
the minority risks the prospect of splitting its vote and failing to elect any
62. Like cumulative voting, STV relies on the concept of a threshold of exclusion.
The threshold for winning a legislative seat in an STV election is V/(N+I) +1, where V is
the total number of votes and N is the number of seats to be filled. In ajurisdiction with
10,000 voters and five seats, 1,667 votes will be sufficient to elect a candidate, and any
candidate receiving that many first-place votes will be deemed elected (no more than five
candidates can win 1,667 first-place votes). If one or more candidates (but fewer than five)
cross the electoral threshold on first-place votes, their "surplus" votes-that is, the votes
above the threshold which were unnecessary to elect them-will be redistributed to the
second choices named by those voters, so that additional winners may be determined. If
no candidate crosses the threshold on the initial count, the last-place candidate is
dropped, and his or her votes are transferred to the candidates listed as the second
preference on those ballots which listed the losing candidate as the first preference. If any
candidate now has reached the threshold, that candidate is elected. If not, the next lowest
candidate is dropped and the process of ballot transfers continues until all the seats are
filled.
Transferring the votes of losing candidates is straightforward. All of the ballots of an
eliminated candidate are simply transferred to the voters' next choices. The transfer of the
surplus votes of winning candidates, however, is more complicated, and several methods
are used. One is simply to declare a candidate elected once his or her vote crosses the
threshold of exclusion and to treat all subsequently counted ballots as surplus, to be
applied to the second choices listed on those ballots. A second method, used in Ireland
where STV is the basic election system, is to select randomly among the winning
candidate's ballots. A third method, probably the preferable one now that computers can
be used to count votes, is to distribute a winning candidate's surplus votes according to the
percentage of second choice preferences registered on the winning candidate's ballots.
See generally Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy
for Minority Vote Dilution, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 781, 790 (1993) (describing alternative
versions of STV).
63. One vote more than one-sixth of the vote is enough to win a seat in a five-member
legislature because only five candidates can each win one vote more than one-sixth of the
vote.
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of its choices.64 If the minority constitutes a large proportion of the pop-
ulation and might reasonably seek two or more seats, cumulative voting
might result in only one minority seat if minority voters do not divide
their votes evenly between the candidates but, instead, give one candidate
more votes than she needs for victory while failing to provide the other
candidate with sufficient votes to win.
Guinier presents a scenario of ajurisdiction with 1,000 voters, 250 of
whom are black, and a ten-member legislative body (pp. 96-97). If such
a jurisdiction used cumulative voting, the minority would need only 91
votes to win a seat.65 Guinier assumes that the black electorate would
divide itself up into two groups of 91, with 68 voters left over. The two
groups of 91 would each take a seat, and the group of 68 would be able to
"join with 23 sympathetic whites to elect a third candidate who is also
electorally accountable" (p. 97). In this manner, blacks would win their
proportionate share of the legislative seats.
But Guinier's example appears to rest on an unduly optimistic ap-
praisal of the ability of a large group of ordinary voters to organize itself
and to assign different specific voters to different candidates. It also
makes the rosy assumption that an individual black candidate will be con-
tent to win just 91 votes and will direct potential supporters to the other
black candidate in order to enhance the number of blacks elected. Few
candidates are so confident of election or so committed to the advance-
ment of their group in addition to their own success that they believe
there are "surplus" votes that can be given to a potential competitor.
Thus, although cumulative voting makes it easier to elect one minority
candidate, it is unlikely to produce "full proportional representation" for
the minority.6 6 That is why political scientists refer to it as a
semiproportional system.
67
64. See Amy, supra note 14, at 186-87.
65. Applying the formula of 1/(1+N) +1, with N=10, in ajurisdiction of 1000 voters,
the minimum number of votes necessary to win a seat is 1/(1 + 10) or 1/11 of 1000, or 90,
plus 1, which is 91.
66. See Amy, supra note 14, at 186.
67. See id.
In addition to omitting discussion of proportional representation systems, Guinier
also fails to consider an alternative form of semiproportional representation: limited
voting. Like cumulative voting, limited voting avoids districting. But instead of allowing
voters to cumulate their votes, limited voting limits the number of votes a voter can cast to
fewer than the number of seats to be filled in the election. This can prevent the same
majority from dominating the election for every seat and can enable a sufficiently large
and cohesive minority to win a seat.
Like cumulative voting, limited voting relies on the "threshold of exclusion" concept.
The formula for threshold of exclusion is V/(V+N) + 1, where V is the number of votes a
voter may cast and N is the number of seats to be filled. See Engstrom, supra note 62, at
786. Where V is 1-that is, each voter is limited to just one vote-the threshold of
exclusion for limited voting is the same as that for cumulative voting. In a locality that
elects a five-member legislature, if each voter is limited to one vote, then the threshold of
exclusion is 1/(1+5) + 1, so that a minority that casts one-sixth of the vote will be able to
win one seat even if the minority's candidate receives no nonminority votes.
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STV's vote transfer mechanism may be more likely to produce a pro-
portionate result. Where a group has more than two candidates, and one
receives enough first-place votes to be elected, STV would transfer her
"surplus" ballots to the next choices on those ballots. If the second-
choices are the candidates of the minority group, then the group may
elect a second candidate. Moreover, if no minority candidate wins on
first-place votes, the vote transfer mechanism could reallocate votes from
the weaker minority candidate to the stronger, thus reducing the possibil-
ity that competition among minority candidates would deny the minority
a seat.
6 8
Between 1963 and 1982, ten seats on the City Council of the City of New York were
elected on a two-per-borough basis through borough-wide limited voting. This system
limited both the number of votes a voter could cast and the number of candidates a party
could nominate to one in each borough. It guaranteed the election of at least five non-
Democrats at a time when nearly all the councilmembers elected from single-member
districts were Democrats. See Blaikie v. Power, 193 N.E.2d 55, 56 (N.Y. 1963). Limited
voting has been used for local elections in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and New York, see
Bernard Grofman et al., Minority Representation and the Quest for Equality 125 (1992),
and in elections to the national legislatures in Japan and Spain. See Arend Lijphart et al.,
The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and
Spanish Examples, in Grofman and Lijphart, Electoral Laws, supra note 38, at 154, 163-68.
Limited voting has been used as a remedy in a handful of vote dilution cases in which
the minority population was geographically dispersed so that it was difficult to create
compact predominantly minority districts. See Engstrom, supra note 39, at 758-60.
Limited voting deprives voters of the opportunity to vote for a separate candidate for
each seat to be filled. Cumulative voting, by contrast, gives voters options. The voter can
vote for each seat to be filled, or the voter can vote strategically to maximize the chances of
success of her most intensely preferred candidate. On the other hand, limited voting is
simpler. With cumulative voting, voters would have to be instructed that they may cast
multiple votes for the same candidate, and voting machines would have to be modified
accordingly.
68. For example, assume an election with 1000 voters, 300 minority voters and 700
majority voters; three seats to be filled; two minority-preferred candidates, and three
majority-preferred candidates. Assume that the majority votes only for majority-preferred
candidates; that it spreads its first-place votes evenly across its candidates (233 or 234 per
candidate); and that majority voters' subsequent preferences are also only for majority
candidates. Assume that minority voters split, 170 first-place votes for candidate A and 130
first-place votes for candidate B, and that voters for candidate B list candidate A as their
second choice.
In order to win, a candidate needs 1000/(3+1) + 1, or 251, votes. On the first count,
candidate B would be eliminated. But B's voters would have listed A as their second
choice, and on the second round B's votes would go to A, giving him 300 votes and a seat.
Subsequently, the weakest majority candidate would be eliminated and the other two
elected.
If this scenario had been played out in a cumulative voting election, all three majority
candidates might have been elected if minority voters had split their cumulated votes
among two candidates. Alternatively, only one minority candidate might have run, thereby
denying the supporters of the other minority candidate the opportunity to express their
strongest preference and the opportunity to identify themselves as a political group, and
denying the community useful information concerning the existence and strength of
candidate B's supporters.
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(b) STV and diversity of representation. - STV may increase the pros-
pects for minority representation without suppressing divergent points of
view within the minority group. With STV, there could be multiple candi-
dates from a group, and the concomitant expression of a variety of view-
points, without undermining the group's opportunity to elect a candidate
of its choice. A conservative black voter, for example, could give her first-
place vote to a conservative black candidate and then, if race dominates
ideology in her political priorities, give her second-place vote to a more
liberal black candidate. In this way, STV could function as both a primary
election and a general election in a single ballot, with minority voters
participating in an intragroup election without jeopardizing their
chances for electoral success in the intergroup election.
Similarly, STV may better advance Guinier's agenda of representing
"voluntary constituencies that self-identify their interests" (p. 97) than
would cumulative voting. Like districting, cumulative voting rewards only
first-place votes: This discourages voters from voting for those candidates
who may best represent their views but who, the voters think, are unlikely
to garner enough votes to win election. As a result, the ballots cast may
understate the real level of support for those candidates among the elec-
torate. This, in turn, serves to discourage candidates who represent
groups that do not approach a plurality in a single-member district system
or the threshold of exclusion in a cumulative voting jurisdiction from
even running. This denies their potential supporters the opportunity to
vote for them and denies the community the awareness of the existence
and size of such a political group. 69 In practice, much as districting fa-
vors local majorities, cumulative voting is likely to help only the largest
minority and "not the full range of minority political groups."70 Like dis-
tricting, cumulative voting tends to hold down the number of parties or
groups that can win representation, even if cumulative voting is less
restrictive.
STV can remove this disincentive to vote for candidates perceived to
have less chance of winning, since the voter can give her first-choice vote
to the long-shot who is her most preferred candidate, while choosing
among the perceived front-runners for her second-place selection. If the
first-choice candidate fails to win election, and the front-runners have not
won enough votes to fill all the seats at issue, the ballot can be counted in
the contest among the front-runners. Moreover, if enough voters are no
longer discouraged from voting for the long-shot by the fear that their
ballots will be wasted, then the long-shot might actually win. Alterna-
tively, the voter could list the long-shot in second place. If the first-place
winner wins easily, and a sufficient number of other voters also list the
69. This is one of the explanations for "Duverger's Law," the proposition expressed by
French political scientist Maurice Duverger, that plurality voting without a runoff favors
the two-party system. See William H. Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in Grofian &
Lijphart, Electoral Laws, supra note 38, at 19, 29.
70. Amy, supra note 14, at 186.
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long-shot as a second choice, then the transfer of "surplus" votes could
also transform the long-shot into a winner. Even if the long-shot is un-
able to capture a legislative seat, the existence of the group, and the ex-
tent of its political support, will be more clearly known, and the long-shot,
and the long-shot's constituency, may become more of a factor in local
politics.
(c) STV and competitive elections. - For these reasons, STV may also
be more likely than cumulative voting to promote competitive elections.
Cumulative voting requires group solidarity, discourages intragroup com-
petition, and may lead to de facto deals among the major groups to allo-
cate seats. In the major American political experience with cumulative
voting 7l-in three-member districts in elections for the lower house of
the Illinois legislature-"party leaders frequently agree [d] in advance on
the number of nominees so that often there [were] only three-two for
the dominant party, one for the minority party."72 Like districting, cumu-
lative voting can produce "safe seats" and uncontested elections. With its
built-in incentive to vote for more candidates, STV may be more likely to
increase electoral competitiveness.
(d) STV and cross-racial alliances. - Finally, STV would appear to be
better than cumulative voting in achieving Guinier's other goal-reduc-
ing racial polarization in the legislature. By eliminating racially homoge-
neous black and white districts and using jurisdiction-wide electoral units,
both cumulative voting and STV at least make it possible for some candi-
dates to achieve electoral success by putting together a platform that ap-
peals to some blacks and some whites. STV's preferential voting mecha-
nism, however, offers an additional incentive for reducing racial
polarization.
Cumulative voting enables minorities to cumulate their votes for one
candidate so that the intensity of the group's preference overcomes the
group's minority status. Cumulative voting's structural incentive in ra-
cially polarized jurisdictions for cumulating votes behind the most in-
tensely preferred candidate is, thus, in deep tension with cumulative vot-
ing's potential for cross-racial voting. STV could mute that tension,
although not eliminate it, by enabling voters to register several degrees of
preference, thus giving them an opportunity to support their own
71. The most significant use of cumulative voting in American political elections was
in Illinois where, from 1870 to 1980, the members of the lower house of the state
legislature were elected by cumulative voting from three-member districts. In 1970, Illinois
voters voted to retain cumulative voting in a separate ballot question presented as part of a
referendum on a new state constitution, but they voted to abolish cumulative voting in
1980 when they approved a cost-cutting ballot measure that reduced the size of the
legislature. See Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems
in the United States, in Lijphart & Grofrnan, Electoral System, supra note 38, at 197.
72. Dixon, supra note 49, at 523; see also Weaver, supra note 71, at 198 ("The
principal reason why CV lasted so long in Illinois was that it was based on a bargain
between the major parties and was an expression of a 'live-and-let-live' approach to
political competition.").
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group's candidate and the most attractive candidates of other groups
without undermining the prospects of their own-group's first choice.
This, in turn, gives candidates an even stronger incentive to campaign
across group lines. With STV, candidates might appeal to the voters of
groups who would be unlikely to give them first-place votes but might
provide them crucial second-place votes. For example, black voters could
give their highest preferences to black candidates and their lower-ranked
preferences to the white candidates most attractive to them. If the suc-
cessful black candidate or candidates win more votes than they need to be
assured of their seats, their "surplus" would be transferred to the black-
preferred white candidates. This could induce some white candidates to
campaign for black votes, and ultimately increase the legislature's atten-
tion to black political concerns.
It is not clear why Guinier gave no attention to STV and instead fo-
cused exclusively on cumulative voting. STV is a more complicated sys-
tem than cumulative voting,73 and it works a greater departure from dis-
tricting. There is relatively little experience with STV in the United States
and it could be that its theoretical advantages will fail to materialize in
practice.7 4 Perhaps Guinier feared that STV is so different from district-
ing that it is, as a practical matter, a nonstarter. On the other hand, STV
may have greater potential than cumulative voting to advance Guinier's
goals of proportionate minority interest representation, the representation
of smaller groups and dissidents within existing groups, and appeals
across group lines. Certainly, whatever the strengths and weaknesses of
STV, any consideration of the process of electing a democratic legislature
ought to examine the full range of options, not just cumulative voting.
C. Legislative Elections and the Nature of Legislative Representation
Cumulative voting is not the antithesis of districting, but rather more
of a half-way house between districting and proportional representa-
tion.75 Notwithstanding the "radical" and "way out" charges levelled
against her, Guinier has proffered a relatively moderate alternative to the
existing American system of representation. But even though cumulative
73. As two leading scholars of electoral laws have properly observed, "complexity
introduces an elitist inequity of its own, even if the purpose is increased 'fairness': the
more complex a system becomes, the fewer people can comprehend it in order to make
use of its opportunities." Taagepera & Shugart, supra note 54, at 228.
74. As Taagepera and Shugart note, "STV is attractive... theoretically... but it has
been used in so few countries that possible problem areas may remain untested." Id. at
237; see also id. at 27-28, 48-49 (noting extent of support for STV among political
scientists). For a brief version of the argument for STV from a longstanding American
proponent, see George H. Hallett, Jr., Proportional Representation with the Single
Transferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections, in Lijphart & Grofman,
Electoral System, supra note 38, at 113-25.
75. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 49, at 524 (cumulative voting "is in a sense an
American two-party version" of proportional representation).
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voting is only half-way down the road from districting to proportionality,
why should Americans take any steps down that road at all?
The move from districting to proportionality has two critical fea-
tures: (1) a shift in the basis of representation from territory, which al-
lows different geographic areas in ajurisdiction to hold seats in the legis-
lature, to voter-identified, non-place-based interests; and (2) the likely
inclusion of more conflicting interests in the legislature, which can make
it more difficult to assemble a legislative majority and to govern.
1. What Interests Should a Legislature Represent? - In framing an elec-
toral system with the goal of creating a legislature that represents descrip-
tively its polity-a portrait of the people in miniature-different methods
will serve to highlight particular descriptions of the polity while poten-
tially obscuring others. Moreover, no legislature of reasonable size can
assure representation of all the salient divisions in a society. Thus, the
selection of an electoral system is inevitably a selection among different
ways of describing a polity, a decision to prefer one description over an-
other. Although Guinier overstates the case against territorial districts,
there is considerable force to her argument that voter-selected interests,
rather than territory, is an appropriate way of organizing a system of
representation.
As Elaine Spitz notes, "[gleographic boundaries have served tradi-
tionally, and perhaps intuitively, as the most common basis" for represen-
tation.7 6 Geography serves this purpose not because, as Guinier suggests,
proponents of territorial representation think "that mere geographical
subdivisions have interests distinct from those of the people who inhabit
them," (p. 133) but because "there is a spatial dimension to human or-
ganization." 7 7 Many of the most important interests and concerns people
have relate to their homes, their neighbors, and their immediate sur-
roundings. People may choose to settle in territories in which, they be-
lieve, the current residents share their views and concerns, so that territo-
rial and interest representation may be closely linked.78 Even when the
choice of residence is constrained by income or discriminatory prac-
tices, 79 neighbors will have common experiences. These common exper-
iences may lead to a shared perspective on public affairs and political
values. Territory, thus, can be an important determinant of interests.
Moreover, physical proximity facilitates the discussion, debate, and delib-
erative interaction desirable in a democracy.
The extent to which districts are an appropriate form of election also
turns on what the government in question does and on the size of the
76. Elaine Spitz, Majority Rule 56 (1984).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol.
Econ. 416, 418 (1956) (consumer-voter may be viewed as picking community which best
satisfies person's preference for public goods).
79. As Guinier notes, many people do not exercise real choice in deciding their place
of residence (pp. 136, 141).
[Vol. 95:418
1995] LANI GUINIER AND DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY 443
jurisdiction. Where the principal role of the government is to supply
services to residents-schools, garbage collection, street repair, crime
control-then representation by place of residence is a reasonable form
of legislative organization. Services like fixing a pothole, installing a traf-
fic light, cracking down on a nuisance, maintaining a firehouse, and pa-
trolling the streets are intensely local, and a system of election that as-
sures that there will be one representative to whom residents may look for
the place-based problems that affect their neighborhood is not unreason-
able.80 Moreover, place-specific problems are an important focal point of
popular protest and provide incentives to grass-roots political action. In a
state or a large city, the use of territorial subdivisions to organize politics
and to elect representatives may thus be desirable. In a smaller jurisdic-
tion, districts may not be needed to satisfy these place-based interests.
Finally, depending on the size of the jurisdiction, eliminating or re-
ducing territorial subdivisions could dramatically increase the cost of
election campaigns. This could skew the results in favor of incumbents,
those who receive the most media attention, and those with the largest
campaign war chests.
Nevertheless, as Guinier contends, territory is only a rough approxi-
mation of interest. Some interests are not place-based. Some politically
salient groups may be dispersed throughout a community and may have
trouble obtaining representation in a purely territorial system. Many sig-
nificant governmental tasks have a minimal relationship to territory, and
important policy questions may be better deliberated by the representa-
tives of all the politically salient interests than by territorial representa-
tives. Moreover, as Guinier astutely notes, due to the "one person, one
vote" doctrine, territorial districts can no longer map onto pre-existing
neighborhoods (p. 137).81 Today, district lines are often arbitrary. They
can fragment neighborhoods and combine different communities into
heterogeneous units for legislative elections, thus compounding the pos-
sibility that many people within a territorial constituency will feel unrep-
resented by the person elected from the district.
Under these circumstances, while some values in representation
might be lost in a switch from districting to cumulative voting, others
could be gained. The balance of costs and benefits would be affected by
the functions of the government, the size of the jurisdiction, and the na-
80. See Nancy L. Schwartz, The Blue Guitar Political Representation and
Community 31-32 (1988) (service responsiveness requires single-member districts).
Without territorial districting, it is possible that some areas of a jurisdiction will be
overrepresented (relative to population) in the legislature and other areas
underrepresented. For example, although the borough of Manhattan constitutes just one-
fifth of the population of New York City, the City has been governed by Mayors who are
Manhattan residents for 36 out of the last 40 years. This may be one element of "outer
borough" disaffection with "the City."
81. See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and
Local Governments, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1993) (examining difficulties of equally
weighted vote requirements to American local governments).
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ture of the political divisions within it. As Guinier contends, for some
types of governments and in some communities, cumulative voting would
create a more representative legislature. Particularly where race and
ethnicity are politically salient but the minority groups are residentially
dispersed, cumulative voting could enhance the representativeness of the
legislature, and moreover, it could do so without resort to the race-con-
scious line-drawing that has offended many observers.
2. How Representative Should a Legislature Be? - It might be thought
that a too-representative legislature-like a too-thin or too-rich person-
is an impossibility, but some political scientists suggest that there is a
tradeoff between representation and governance, with greater represen-
tativeness purchased at the cost of reducing the legislature's ability to
govern.82
As Elaine Spitz has observed, "[v]oting is not intended only to repre-
sent all shades of opinion. Voting also takes place in order to settle dis-
putes" and to "make joint social endeavor possible."8 3 The more conflict-
ing interests there are, the more difficult it will be to reach a decision.
Districting provides one form of dispute resolution. By limiting legisla-
tive seats to those who win a majority of votes within a given territory,
single-member districts tend to limit the range of interests represented in
the legislature and to promote the two-party system.84 In this way, "a sub-
stantial reduction of alternatives occurs before the election,"8 5 and the
"integrative process of compromise and adjustment" occurs within the
minds of the voters.8 6 Voters are presented with just a small number of
electoral choices. The one that garners the votes of a majority of voters
generally wins control of the legislature and governs, while another be-
comes the focus of opposition. Even if no one party wins a majority, the
small number of parties facilitates the formation of a legislative majority.
In proportional and semiproportional systems, by contrast, many
more parties or interests can win legislative seats. "[C]ompromise takes
place in the legislature ... after the election" rather than in the minds of
the voters before the election.87 With a large number of parties contend-
ing, no party may win a majority and legislative deadlock can result. After
the. election, many possible coalitions of various small legislative group-
ings could form a governing majority. Thus, the election itself has an
attenuated effect in deciding who will form a government and determine
policies. One of the lessons of the Italian "first Republic" is that legisla-
82. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Representation and Governance: The Great
Legislative Trade-Off, 103 Pol. Sci. Q. 461, 482 (1988).
83. Spitz, supra note 76, at 26, 30.
84. See discussion of Duverger's Law, supra note 69. Single-member districts
necessarily entail plurality voting within a district. Of course, jurisdiction-wide at-large or
multi-member elections without cumulative voting or any proportionality rule, would favor
the two-party system, or the largest interests, even more strongly.
85. Spitz, supra note 76, at 26.
86. Dixon, supra note 49, at 56-57.
87. Spitz, supra note 76, at 26.
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ive proportionality may lead to frequent changes in government but few
changes in governance and that a highly representative legislature may be
sclerotic rather than responsive to the people.
88
In short, an electoral system that makes the legislature a more accu-
rate barometer of voter preferences may make it more difficult for the
legislature to convert preferences into policies. Maurice Duverger con-
trasts proportionality's "representation of opinions" with districting's
"representation of wills," in which "the decisive act of choosing the gov-
erning team may be accomplished by the voters themselves instead of
being left to" their representatives.8 9 Democracy entails both the repre-
sentation of opinions and the representation of wills, but in Duverger's
view there is "an unresolvable contradiction" between the two. 9°
Cumulative voting would shift the representation/governance trade-
off in the direction of representation. Would there be too great a cost in
terms of governance? As with the consideration of the choice between
territorial and non-territorial forms of representation, much depends on
context, including the structure of the government in question, the role
of representatives in the government, and the range and nature of the
divisions within the jurisdiction.
In settings with relatively powerful and independent executives and
relatively weak legislatures (such as many state governments and "strong
mayor/weak council" cities) a more diverse legislative body would not
impede decisive government action. An independently elected executive
generally mutes the political fragmentation and instability often associ-
ated with proportional representation. Moreover, the broader range of
opinions reflected in the legislature could make the government more
attentive to diverse constituencies. On the other hand, in those localities
with strong legislative councils or commissions and weak executives (or
no independently elected executive at all), a more representative legisla-
ture might reduce the ability of government to take decisive action. Still,
the absence of separation of powers and bicameralism in those localities
means that the legislature is currently far more capable of action on local
matters than is the norm in the federal and state governments. A more
representative body might be less decisive but not below levels acceptable
in the American political tradition-although the rising concern about
"gridlock" in the national government in recent decades hints at the de-
gree of loss of confidence in a government that fails to address pressing
88. See id. at 38 ("the overall fluctuations" in proportional systems are "weaker" than
in plurality systems).
89. Maurice Duverger, Which Is the Best Electoral System?, in Lijphart & Grofman,
Electoral System, supra note 38, at 32-33.
90. See id. at 33. Not all political scientists agree that there is a tension between
proportionality of representation and effective governance. See, e.g., Arend Lijphart,
Constitutional Choices for New Democracies, 2J. Democracy 72, 76 (1991) (arguing that
proportional representation is more effective than plurality at maintaining unity and
peace).
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public problems. We need to know more about the effectiveness of pro-
portional and semiproportional systems in those jurisdictions that have
used them.
The number of interests and the size of the legislature are also im-
portant. Cumulative voting is less representative than proportional sys-
tems. In many jurisdictions, cumulative voting will benefit just one large
minority. This might enhance representativeness without crippling gov-"
ernance. Similarly, in a smaller legislature fewer interests will be repre-
sented than in a larger body, so that greater proportionality might be
achieved without harm to governance.
Nor is decisive action the only measure of successful governance. A
government's actions must also be acceptable to its people and respon-
sive to their concerns. As Guinier notes, "political stability depends on
the perception that the system is fair" (p. 9). That perception is undercut
when the government ignores the interests and concerns of a significant
portion of its citizenry. Representation of the minority in the legislature
contributes to the perception of fairness, and thus enhances the stability
of the polity. To that extent, representation is a component of govern-
ance as well as a constraint on it.91
As Hanna Pitkin has noted, there is a correlation between a society's
interest in proportionality as the focus of representation and the intensity
of divisions within that society.9 2 Even though proportionality "in-
troduces into the legislature the irreconcilable antagonisms that pervade
the society," people in a divided society "insist on it because they feel that
only a member chosen from the particular group can act in its interest.
And they may sometimes be right."93 Without deciding whether racial
polarization is an "irreconcilable antagonism[]," greater proportionality
may be imperative for effective governance in a polarized polity if it is
necessary to give minorities the assurance that their interests are consid-
ered in the course of government policy formation.
3. Summary. - There is no one best-or most "representative" or
most "democratic-electoral system. Context counts. Different electo-
ral rules may be appropriate in different places, much as different systems
will have different consequences for different interests and different func-
tions of government. Given the scarcity of experience in the United
States with cumulative voting and other alternatives to single-member dis-
tricting, we cannot be sure how those alternatives would perform in
American states and localities. Although the loss of territorial representa-
91. Cf. Taagepera & Shugart, supra note 54, at 63 ("[L]ong-range stability depends on
semiregular alternation of parties in power, so that no major group feels permanently
excluded and the ruling party leaders do not grow stale. If the same party always gets to
rule, the system may be unstable in the long run.").
92. See Pitkin, supra note 33, at 213-14.
93. Id. at 214; see also Lijphart, supra note 90, at 75 (proportional representation
typically adopted to provide representation for ethnic and religious minorities "and
thereby to counteract potential threats to national unity and political stability").
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tion and the potential for greater fragmentation and conflict counsel
against any precipitous or general move to a more proportional system,
neither concern should preclude serious attention to alternatives in spe-
cific settings.94 Courts should not assume that single-member districting
is the only appropriate remedy for vote dilution nor the only fair method
of electing representatives. 95 Congress should amend the federal law that
requires members of the House of Representatives to be elected from
single-member districts96 and permit states to consider the adoption of
multi-member districts, provided that cumulative voting, STV, or some
other mechanism that assures minority representation is used.
The critical issue is that alternative modes of representation be con-
sidered in light of the circumstances of particular communities. States
and localities should be aware of the broad range of options for electing a
democratic legislature and should give fresh attention to the various pos-
sibilities. Guinier's book provides an important beginning to this process
of public education and to the evaluation of alternatives. Indeed, due to
the combined effect of the new hurdle to race-conscious districting raised
by Shaw v. Reno, discontent with so-called "racial gerrymandering,"97 and
the attention drawn to Guinier's views during the furor over her nomina-
94. Nor are cumulative voting and territorial districts mutually exclusive. Electoral
systems can combine territorial districts, with some jurisdiction-wide proportional or
semiproportional representation. Under the "additional member" plan used in Germany,
half the seats in the Bundestag are filled by the winners of district elections, and half are
filled by party proportionality. The voters vote for district representatives and for the party
of their choice (which may differ from the party of their candidate for a district seat).
After the district winners are elected and the party preferences tabulated, members of the
parties are added from regional party lists until each party has seats equivalent to its
proportion of the party preferences. See Amy, supra note 14, at 15-17, 228-30.
95. See McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 118 (4th Cir. 1988) ("If a vote
dilution violation is established, the appropriate remedy is to restructure the districting
system to eradicate, to the maximum extent possible by that means, the dilution proximately
caused by that system ....").
In McGhee, the trial court had ordered the implementation of a limited voting plan as
a remedy for vote dilution in the at-large election of a seven-member board of county
commissioners. See id. at 113-14. Blacks made up 44% of the county's total population,
41% of its voting age population, and 39.5% of its registered voters, but no black had ever
been elected to the board. See id. at 113. The county had proposed a single-member
district plan, but, due to residential dispersal of minority population, the "very best"
districting plan would create just one black-majority district and another district in which
blacks had "no better than a fighting chance," whereas a limited voting plan would have
given blacks "a fair chance" of winning three of the seven seats. Id. at 113-14. The court
of appeals reversed, finding that the district court was required to defer to the county's
remedy, so long as it was the best districting plan that could be adopted, even if the limited
voting plan would have provided more proportional representation. See id. at 118-21.
96. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1988).
97. See, e.g., Jim Wooten, Racial Electoral Districts Create Division, Atlanta J. &
Const., Apr. 23, 1994, at G7.
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tion,98 cumulative voting is now on the American political agenda as
never before.99
Recently, a federal district court opted for cumulative voting over a
districting plan as a remedy in a vote dilution case in an opinion that
echoed many of Guinier's arguments. Judge Joseph H. Young preferred
cumulative voting to districting because it "will allow the voters, by the
way they exercise their votes, to 'district' themselves based on what they
think rather than where they live," and because it "is less likely to increase
polarization between different interests since no group receives special
treatment at the expense of others as would occur in a single-member
district with one black majority district." 100 Although Judge Young was
subsequently reversed by the court of appeals, his views-and Guinier's-
are increasingly central to contemporary thinking about fair
representation.' 0
With respect to cumulative voting at least, "Lani Guinier's revenge"
may be at hand.
102
98. See, e.g., A New Shape for Democracy, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 16, 1994, at
14B.
99. See, e.g., Cumulative Voting Captures Imagination of Electoral Reformers, 82
Nat'l Civic Rev. 72, 72, 74 (1993) (Cincinnati, Ohio and Davidson County, North Carolina
considering cumulative voting); Michael Kenney, State Mulls Voting Change, Boston
Globe, June 12, 1994, City Weekly Section, at 9 (Massachusetts legislature considering
cumulative voting for elections to Boston City Council); Don Noel, An Alternative to
Racial Gerrymandering, Hartford Courant, June 30, 1993, at D13 ("The discarded Lani
Guinier may yet earn a respectful hearing from mainstream politicians.").
100. Cane v. Worcester County, 847 F. Supp. 369, 373 (D. Md. 1994) affd in part,
rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994). Cane differs from earlier vote dilution cases in
which semiproportional remedies were approved because in those cases the dispersal of
the minority population precluded the creation of majority-minority single-member
districts. In Cane a black majority district could have been created. See id. at 372. But cf.
Neil A. Lewis, Maryland County Embroiled in Voting Rights Suit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1994,
at B8 (black majority district would cut "across the county, picking up black
neighborhoods in three towns"; it "would resemble a skinny dinosaur on its hind legs").
101. The court of appeals determined that the district court "failed to give due
deference" to the county's preference for a districting system "that would ensure that the
Board members were knowledgeable of and responsive to the diverse interests of the
various regions of the County." Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 928 (4th Cir.
1994). Cane, thus, nicely presents the conflict between a territorial and interest-based
vision of representation. According to the court of appeals, the district court must defer
'to the greatest extent possible," id., to the affected local government in choosing among
alternative acceptable remedies. In this case the local government preferred a
representation scheme based on territory. The fourth circuit left open "whether facts and
circumstances mightjustify the imposition of a cumulative voting plan" where there was no
clearly expressed preference for territorial representation. Id.
102. Unfortunately, but understandably in light of the controversy that surrounded
Guinier's nomination, many politicians who are interested in the substance of Guinier's
ideas have sought to distance themselves from any association with Guinier. Thus, when
Boston Mayor Ray Flynn proposed the use of cumulative voting, with voters able to
cumulate up to four votes for one candidate, to elect that city's School Committee, his
supporters insisted that " 'Flynn's position isn't Lani Guinier's position .... Under this
proposal, each person gets the same four votes to do with what they wish.'" Peter S.
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III. MAjoirrv RuLE AND RACIAL POLARIZATION WITHIN A
DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEGISLATURE
Although the adoption of cumulative voting would effect a dramatic
change in the way Americans elect legislators, from a Voting Rights Act
perspective the pursuit of cumulative voting would really be only a tactical
shift in remedies to provide a more effective way than districting of secur-
ing the current goal of enabling minority voters to elect representatives.
Moreover, the notion that political groups ought to be represented in the
legislature in rough proportion to their relative presence in the electo-
rate is not a radical one, but rather has a longstanding pedigree in demo-
cratic theory. Guinier's proposal to apply the Voting Rights Act to voting
rules within legislatures is much bolder. It would work a major expansion
in the scope of liability under the Act, and it relies on a theory that de-
mocracy entails not simply proportionality in the election of representa-
tives but proportionality in legislative outcomes.
This Part first examines Guinier's proposal to apply the Voting
Rights Act to the inner workings of a representative but racially polarized
legislature and her underlying theoretical endeavor to apply a propor-
tionality constraint to majority rule. It then presents objections to her
interpretation of the Act and considers the practicality of Guinier's more
general project of reconceiving majority rule as a matter of "taking
turns." Finally, it suggests that although Guinier's solution is not persua-
sive, racial division raises a troubling question for the fairness of majority
rule. The significance of that question, and perhaps its solution, requires
further consideration of just how divided we are.
A. Attacking Majority Rule Within a Representative but Polarized Legislature
1. Extending The Voting Rights Act to Vote Dilution Within the Legislature.
- At the heart of Guinier's critique of the "black electoral success the-
ory" is the argument that black electoral success alone is insufficient to
realize "the civil rights movement's transformative vision of politics." For
her, "the purpose of political equal opportunity" is not simply "fairness in
the struggle for a seat at the bargaining table," but "fairness in the compe-
tition for favorable policy outcomes" (p. 69). Not only must minorities be
represented in the legislature, but also they must "have a fair chance to
have their policy preferences satisfied" (p. 70).
Guinier argues that racial polarization and minority isolation within
the legislature is a serious obstacle to the opportunity of blacks to obtain
satisfaction of their policy preferences. In a legislature that operates
under majority rule, a hostile majority may simply refuse to deal with mi-
nority legislators or to consider their proposals. Thus, the pattern of ra-
cial polarization among the electorate can be "reproduce[d]" within the
legislature (p. 65). Minority representatives may be "marginalized" (p.
Canellos, School Board Voting Proposal Finds Backers, Questioners, Boston Globe, July 9,
1993, at 13, 20. But, of course, that was exactly Guinier's proposal.
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61) or "isolated and ignored" (p. 64) within the legislature so that they
have "technical access" (p. 69) but no impact on deliberations or policy
determinations.
To attack "resegregation within the walls of a formally integrated leg-
islature" (p. 104), Guinier would foster a "third[ ] generation" (p. 104) of
voting rights litigation directed at legislative decisional rules, particularly
simple majority voting, that have the effect of denying the minority the
fair satisfaction of its policy preferences. In a "second generation" (p. 8)
case an otherwise lawful electoral practice, like an at-large election, can
be challenged as a "standard, practice, or procedure" that denies or
abridges the right to vote in violation of the Act when, due to racial polar-
ization in the electorate, racial minorities are unable to elect their pre-
ferred candidates. So, too, in a "third-generation" case an ordinarily law-
ful legislative rule, like simple majority voting, could be challenged as a
"standard, practice, or procedure" that denies or abridges the right to
vote, when, due to racial polarization in the legislature, racial minorities
are unable to have their policy preferences satisfied (p. 105).
It is a little unclear exactly when Guinier would subject legislative
rules to a "third-generation" claim. The cases she cites involving vote di-
lution in legislatures fall into two categories: (1) the arrival of the first
black or Hispanic representative in a legislature, which precipitated inter-
nal changes that made it more difficult for an individual legislator to af-
fect legislative decisions, or (2) the adoption of unusual procedures (or
the violation of official procedures) to circumvent minority participation
(pp. 8-9, 75-77, 179-81). Typically, the election of the first minority
representative was itself the consequence of a successful vote dilution case
or the settlement of a claim that the prior electoral structure violated the
Voting Rights Act. A longstanding focus of the Act has been on state and
local evasion of federal orders to end discriminatory practices. As the
Supreme Court observed, Congress knew that some jurisdictions had "re-
sorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the
face of adverse federal court decrees" and "had reason to suppose" that
these jurisdictions "might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to
evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act it-
self."' 03 Thus, a special concern of the Act has been with new voting
rules or changes in rules, and there may be a good argument that the Act
ought to apply to rule changes that reallocate political power from newly-
won minority-held offices. The Department ofJustice adhered to this po-
sition and a handful of lower courts accepted it10 4-although the
Supreme Court recently rejected this reading of the Act.105
103. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
104. See Robinson v. Alabama State Dep't of Educ., 652 F. Supp. 484 (M.D. Ala.
1987); Hardy v. Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1985); Horry County v. United States,
449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978).
105. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 829-32 (1992).
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But Guinier's theory would apply far beyond the scenarios of new
rules or changes in rules. Her theory sweeps within its ambit longstand-
ing rules and procedures lacking indicia of invidious intent, so long as
the effect of the rules, in the context of a legislature marked by racial
bloc voting, is to deny the minority a proportionate share of legislative
successes (pp. 77-80, 101-09). This is much bolder than the argument
that the Act can be used to attack unusual procedures or changes in the
rules upon the entry of the first minority members, and would work a
considerable expansion in the scope of the Act. Indeed, as I will suggest
below, it is inconsistent with the procedural spirit of the Act because it
rests on the implicit assumption that groups in society are substantively
entitled to a proportionate share of legislative outcomes.
Moreover, although Guinier insists that she is not attacking majority
voting per se and that a legislative vote dilution case would require proof
of "consistent and deeply engrained [sic]" racial polarization within the
legislature (p. 17), her sweeping rhetorical references to blacks as "the
pariah group: systematic losers in the political marketplace" (p. 37), to "a
racially divided society"(p. 3) and a society "deeply cleaved" by issues of
race (p. 175), and her treatment of a range of economic and social issues
over which blacks and whites tend to disagree as markers of racial polari-
zation suggest that she believes legislative vote dilution claims might be
alleged in many jurisdictions.
Guinier proposes several remedies for legislative vote dilution. She
would avoid "judicial monitoring" of the legislative process-which she
calls "arguably not desirable" (p. 109)-and focus on restructuring the
legislative process on "the model ofjury deliberations" (p. 107) through
the use of rules that promote compromise and consensus by forcing the
majority to deal with the minority. Specifically, she presents the following
remedial options: legislative cumulative voting or "a supermajority vote
on issues of importance to the majority or its equivalent, a minority veto
on critical minority issues" (pp. 108, 116). As I discuss below, there are
problems with each of these remedies.
2. Reconceptualizing the "Rule" in Majority Rule. - Although the pri-
mary focus of Guinier's articles is the Voting Rights Act, her work often
sounds a broader, more theoretical note. Running through Guinier's
analysis is a critique of the principle of majority rule and of the assump-
tion that majority rule is the essence of democracy. "[T]here is nothing
inherent in democracy," Guinier declares, "that requires majority rule" (p. 17).
Instead, she insists "we ought to question the inherent legitimacy" of ma-
jority rule (p. 102).
Guinier's critique of majority rule has two components. First, she
asserts that the fairness of majority rule is contingent on the fluidity of
the majority, that is, on the possibility that different groups will be in the
majority for different issues so that there is no one majority but "shifting
majorities, as the losers at one time or on one issue join with others and
become part of the governing coalition at another time or on another
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issue" (p. 4). If the majority is "fixed and permanent," with a concomi-
tant fixed and permanent minority, then the members of the minority
have no chance ever to be in the majority. In such a situation majority
rule can become majority tyranny (p. 4).
Second, the essence of that tyranny is not that the majority prevails
on any particular issue, but rather that the majority can prevail on every
issue. It is the "winner-take-all" feature of majority rule that draws her
fire, especially the disparity between the percentage of the polity that
composes the majority, and the majority's share of political victories.
Under "winner-take-all" majority rule, a 51% majority can have 100% of
the power (p. 5). At least in a polity marked by a "fixed and permanent"
separation between the majority and the minority, then, "winner-take-all"
majority rule can amount to tyranny. 10 6 Guinier would replace "winner-
take-all" majority rule with a requirement of power-sharing and a princi-
ple of "taking turns" (p. 5). The majority would enjoy most of the power
and prevail on a majority of the issues, but it would be required to "take
turns" with the minority and allow the minority to prevail on some issues.
Given her characterization of her theory as one of "proportionate" inter-
est representation, the minority would presumably be entitled to a per-
centage of "turms" roughly comparable to its proportion of the
population.
Guinier's focus on the "winner-take-all" aspect of majority rule, and
her proffered alternative of a "taking turns" principle, puts an interesting
new spin on a centuries-old problem. Although opponents of Guinier's
nomination treated her criticism of majority rule as a kind of political
sacrilege-a profaning of a basic precept of our secular faith-in fact the
concern about the potential for majority rule to turn into majority tyr-
anny is virtually coextensive with the history of majority rule itself. The
most celebrated exposition of the theory of the American Constitution,
"Federalist No. 10," records the efforts of the Framers to combine major-
ity rule with institutional constraints on the "mischiefs" of majority fac-
106. The scope of Guinier's claim for the unfairness of "winner-take-all" majority rule
is ambiguous. As David M. Esflund has noted, "Guinier is not sufficiently clear about
whether the illegitimacy of the decisions produced by existing white majorities is rooted in
the permanence of this particular majority, the bigoted nature of white voting patterns, or the
very idea of rule in the interests of a majority." David M. Estlund, Who's Afraid of
Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1437, 1475 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
At its narrowest, Guinier's claim is that majority rule is unfair when the majority/
minority divide is racial, and the majority is "racially prejudiced against the minority" (p.
103). At times the claim is somewhat broader, treating "racial bloc voting" as the source of
unfairness without the need to show that the majority is racially prejudiced (p. 102).
(Racial bloc voting might occur without racial bias if there is a strong congruence between
race and economic status, or race and views on the proper scope of government taxation
and social welfare spending.) At its broadest, her claim seems to be that winner-take-all
majority rule is problematic in a "pluralist society" (p. 82) or a "multi-racial society" (p. 5)
per se, apparently presuming that political differences among races are "fixed and
permanent" (p. 4).
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tions.' 07 And the American political system is replete with structures and
institutions-separation of powers, bicameralism, the Senate, 108 federal-
ism, the indirect election of the president-intended to check majority
tyranny.1
09
As Guinier notes, the threat of majority tyranny is often associated
with the existence of a fixed political separation between the majority and
minority (p. 9). The fairness of majority voting as the rule of collective
decisionmaking is based on the assumption that it gives each voter an
equal opportunity to influence the outcome of the decisionmaking pro-
cess.11° But while majority rule may be the only system that, in the ab-
stract, assures each voter an equal opportunity to influence the out-
107. See The Federalist No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
108. The United States Senate is surely one of the most anti-majoritarian institutions
of any democracy. Indeed, one of the ironies of the Guinier nomination was that the
notorious critic of majority rule was to be judged by a body in which the representatives of
a little less than one-fifth of the people of the United States constitute a majority: With the
Senate composed of two senators from each state regardless of population, a majority of
senators can be assembled from the 26 states that have an aggregate population of 44
million people, or less than one-fifth of the more than 250 million people in the United
States. See The 1994 Information Please Almanac 833 (Otto Johnson et al. eds., 47th ed.
1994) (state-by-state population data from 1990 census).
Particularly incongruous was Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole's denunciation of
Guinier as "'consistently hostile to majority rule.'" Michael Isikoff, Confirmation Battle
Looms Over Guinier: Critics Target 'Extreme' Views in Law Review Articles by Justice
Dept. Civil Rights Nominee, Wash. Post, May 21, 1993, at A23. In the 1993-1994 Congress,
when they were the minority party, Senate Republicans repeatedly thwarted the
democratic majority through their successful deployment of Senate Rule XXII, which
requires a three-fifths vote of the full membership of that body to end debate, so that for
many bills the effective Senate voting rule was a supermajority of sixty, rather than a simple
majority of fifty-one. See Arthur S. Flemming & Ray Marshall, Tyranny of the Minority,
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1994, at A15; Hendrik Hertzberg, Catch-XXII, New Yorker, Aug. 22 &
29, 1994, at 9.
The Senate's requirement of sixty votes to cut off debate means that it is theoretically
possible that senators from the 21 states representing just 28 million people, or a little
more than one-eighth of the United States, could prevent Congress from enacting
legislation supported by senators representing the other seven-eighths of the population.
See The 1994 Information Please Almanac, supra. Of course, Senate votes rarely if ever
divide larger from smaller states with such mathematical precision, but due to the
combined effect of the Constitution and the Senate's own rules, the potential for the
representatives of a tiny minority of the population to block the representatives of the vast
majority is there.
109. See, e.g., Jonathan Riley, American Democracy and Majority Rule, in Majorities
and Minorities: NOMOS XXXII 267 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990)
[hereinafter Chapman & Wertheimer]; see also Dahl, supra note 18, at 14-15; Dixon,
supra note 49, at 10.
110. See Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for Simple Majority Decision, 20 Econometrica 680, 681 (1952) (stating that "[t]he second
condition is that each individual be treated the same as far as his influence on the outcome
is concerned"; this is the condition of equality); see also Spitz, supra note 76, at 151,
204-05.
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come,111 majority rule will fail to respect the equality of voters in a polity
divided into a permanent majority and a permanent minority. In such a
divided society, the members of the minority may, as a practical matter,
have no opportunity to influence collective outcomes. In effect, they are
governed by others-like an internal colony-rather than self-governing.
As Brian Barry has observed, "the more closely a society approximates to
the model of a monolithic majority bloc facing a minority which is always
on the losing side,"1 2 the more majority rule will tend "to produce out-
comes that are highly prejudicial to the interests of the minority
group."11
3
The United States Constitution contains a variety of responses to the
threat of majority tyranny. One-the strategy emblematized by the Bill of
Rights-is to protect the most vital interests of the minority by declaring
them to be "fundamental rights," beyond the proper sphere of legislative
infringement, entrenched in a constitution and secured from
majoritarian abuse by judicial review. A second is federalism, which limits
the issues that a majority of the entire society will determine, and, in-
stead, allocates some issues to distinctive autonomous communities
within the broader society. A third strategy is the use of institutions and
structures that slow down the formation of a majority and make it more
difficult to act. Separation of powers and bicameralism work to retard
the ability of the majority to act. Finally, some institutions or procedures,
like equal votes for each state regardless of population in the Senate, sim-
ply empower a minority to block the majority.
114
Guinier's solution to the "tyranny of the majority" is something dif-
ferent. Rather than limit the majority, she would directly empower the
minority. The principle of "taking turns" implies that for some issues-
presumably a percentage of issues that in number and significance mir-
ror the minority's share of the population-the minority would have
power to make a binding decision. Much as proportional representation
assures the election of some minority-preferred legislators despite the mi-
nority's minority status in the jurisdiction as a whole, "taking turns" would
11. A rule that would permit decisions by less than a majority would necessarily be
either (a) indecisive, since in any vote or election there could be more than one winner,
or (b) unequal, since to overcome the indecisiveness problem and have a clear winner, it
would have to give greater weight to the choice of one set of voters over another. A rule
that would require a supermajority for a decision would also be unequal since it gives more
voting power to members of the blocking minority.
112. Brian Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in Philosophy, Politics, and Society 155, 179
(Peter Laslett &James Fishkin eds., 1979).
113. Id. at 188.
114. As previously noted, see supra note 108, the Senate has enhanced its
fundamentally anti-majoritarian posture through its adoption of a supermajority voting
rule for cutting off debate. In a more recent instance of an explicitly anti-majoritarian
voting rule, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives in the 104th Congress
amended the House's rules to require the approval of three-fifths of the House for passage
of any bill that would raise personal or corporate income taxes. See For the Record: New
House Rules, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1995, at A20.
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assure the enactment of some minority-sponsored legislation even
though the minority is a minority in the legislature.
Guinier makes the case for the "taking turns" principle in "civic Re-
publican" terms. In a polarized polity, the majority fears neither defeat
nor defections. It, thus, has no reason to listen to the minority, to consult
with it, or to take its interests into account. Requiring the majority to
share power with the minority will create an incentive for the majority to
deal with the minority across a broader range of issues. The majority is
more likely to confer with the minority, consider its preferences, and
make compromises to win its support. By promoting deliberation, con-
sensus, and compromise (p. 9), over the raw power of the majority, "tak-
ing turns" would thus affect not only the identity of the winners and
losers of particular battles, but also the nature of the political process.
"Taking turns" would make the legislature more deliberative and more
representative of the entire polity. In short, although Guinier would limit
majority rule, her purpose is not anti-democratic, but pro-democratic-to
perfect democracy by enabling the minority to join the majority in engag-
ing in democratic self-government.
The "taking turns" principle also has implications for the substance
and scope of government action. "Taking turns" could provide a way to
reconcile protection of the interests of the minority with an activist, pro-
gressive government. The classic concerns about majority tyranny have
been that the majority would oppress the minority by taking things from
it-that the propertyless mass might tax or take the wealth of the proper-
tied; that a racial, ethnic, or religious majority might deny the minority
basic liberties; that the Northern states might strip the Southerners of
their property in slaves. Thus, the traditional safeguards against majority
tyranny involved limitations on majority action, by either ruling some top-
ics off-limits to the government or making it more difficult for a majority
to make policy. But Guinier's concern, and her definition of oppression,
is not with coerced redistribution from the minority to the majority, but
rather with the failure of the white majority to redistribute to the black
minority to meet its pressing needs.
In Guinier's view, the "social and economic agenda" (p. 45) of the
civil rights movement, and the "black interest agenda" (p. 98) today is
activist and redistributive. It includes attacks on poverty, support for so-
cial welfare spending, affirmative action, and a broader role for govern-
ment in general (pp. 45, 252-53 n.82). The traditional restrictions on
the tyranny of the majority can curb active oppression but they do noth-
ing to satisfy the social and economic needs of blacks. Limited govern-
ment is no solution for a group looking to government for vigorous ac-
tion. But replacement of "winner-take-all" with the principle of "taking
turns," and the attendant notion that the minority is entitled to a propor-
tionate share of legislative victories, could enable the minority to stake its
claim to a share of public resources.
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Ironically, as I will suggest in the next section, the very substantive
implications that make the model attractive for those seeking to make
government more redistributive to minorities doom its prospects under
the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the model of
"taking turns" can be made operational without risking either legislative
deadlock or the kind of close monitoring by external agencies that is in-
consistent with local self-government.
B. The Theoretical and Practical Difficulties of Using the Voting Rights Act To
Attack Legislative Voting
1. Does the Act Apply to Legislative Voting? - The threshold require-
ment for a "third-generation" attack on legislative voting rules, such as
simple majority voting, is that such a rule be a "standard, practice, or
procedure" that affects the right to vote within the meaning of the Voting
Rights Act."15 Ordinarily, voting refers to the casting of ballots by mem-
bers of the electorate. When the question presented to voters on those
ballots is the election of representatives, the rules and procedures that
affect the choices presented to voters and the method of aggregating the
ballots-where different methods of aggregation can yield different re-
sults-directly affect voting. But decisionmaking within the legislature
occurs at one level removed from the voters' voting. Internal legislative
rules have no effect on who votes in the election of representatives or
how those votes determine who is elected.
The argument that legislative voting rules affect the popular right to
vote is particularly vulnerable when there is no claim that the legislative
voting rule was adopted in response to the outcome of a popular election,
or would have the effect of undoing the result of a popular election. As
previously noted, the legislative vote dilution cases that Guinier cites in-
volved either deviations from proper legislative procedure or new rules
adopted after the election of the first minority members (pp. 8-9,
178-81). Such action could be seen as having a more direct impact on
the popular right to vote since it would undo the popular vote-and
would be seen by the local community as clearly intended to do so. 1 1 6
Guinier's theory of legislative vote dilution is, however, not limited to new
rules, unusual rules, or rules intended to negate the results of a popular
election. It would instead apply to standard legislative rules, particularly
simple majority voting, that deny a minority its proportionate share of
political success.117
115. Voting Rights Act of 1965 §§ 2, 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (1988); see supra
note 22.
116. The Supreme Court recently indicated that the intersection of race and
representation is "one area in which appearances do matter." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
2816, 2827 (1993).
117. The suggestion in the text that the Voting Rights Act might apply to changes in
legislative rules or procedures adopted after the election of a minority member was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820
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Guinier attempts to provide a legal foundation for the argument that
legislative rules can affect the popular right to vote by invoking the "trans-
formative vision" of the civil rights movement. The civil rights move-
ment, she argues, saw a direct connection between the right to vote and
legislative outcomes. Protection of the vote was not an end in itself but a
strategy for "political action, effective social change, and... the advance-
ment of a progressive agenda in general" (p. 44). In this view, rules and
procedures that thwart the advancement of that agenda abridge the right
to vote.
But it is not at all clear what role ought to be given to the vision of
the civil rights movement in interpreting the Act. The Voting Rights Act
(1992). Presley considered whether section 5 of the Act-which provides that certain states
and political subdivisions can enforce a new "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," only if they obtain federal
approval, see supra note 22-applies to changes in the decisionmaking authority of the
elected members of two different county commissions. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5,
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Each commission had acted to transfer powers from individual
commissioners to the commission as a whole after a "second generation" suit led to the
replacement of at-large elections with single-member districts and the election of the first
black commissioners. The Court held that even though the changes reduced the power of
minority elected officials, and hence, the power of the voters who elected them, they were
not subject to preclearance because section 5 does not apply to changes that affect the
allocation of power among government officials. Although Guinier is sharply critical of
Presley (pp. 178-81), she does not address its implications for her legislative vote dilution
theory.
If section 5 does not apply to changes that reduce the power of newly-elected minority
officials then it would seem, afortiori, that section 2 of the Act, which reaches pre-existing
standards, practices, and procedures, would not apply to pre-existing internal legislative
rules. The Supreme Court has generally found that the definition of a covered voting
practice or procedure is the same for both sections 2 and 5 of the Act. See, e.g., Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401-02 (1991). Although the presumptive congruence of the
section 2 and section 5 definitions of voting was undermined by a fragmented Court in
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994), it appears that even if the sections differ in scope,
section 5 covers a wider range of electoral practices than section 2.
In Holder, only four Justices-Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, in a
dissenting opinion byJustice Blackmun-clearly adhered to the traditional congruence of
sections 2 and 5. They found the size of a legislature, which had previously been held to be
a "standard, practice, or procedure" related to voting under section 5, was a covered voting
practice under section 2. See id. at 2620. Justice Kennedy and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in
an opinion by Justice Kennedy, found section 2 to be narrower than section 5 when they
determined that although section 5 applied to changes in legislative size, the size of a
legislature is not a "standard, practice, or procedure" for purposes of voting under section
2. See id. at 2585-88. Justice O'Connor agreed with the Blackmun group that sections 2
and 5 apply the same definition of voting "standard, practice, or procedure," and that
legislative size is, thus, a practice affecting voting, but she concluded that a vote dilution
suit could not be brought against legislative size under section 2 because of the lack of a
suitable benchmark for the assessment of dilution. See id. at 2588, 2590-91. Justices
Scalia and Thomas, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, concluded that section 2 does not
support any vote dilution claims. Although Justice Thomas suggested that the theory of
vote dilution is also "in tension with the text of§ 5 itself," he limited his repudiation of vote
dilution to section 2, saving "for another day" the status of vote dilution under section 5.
Id. at 2611 & n.27.
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would never have become law without the heroic efforts of the civil rights
movement, and the views of those who struggled for federal action to
secure the right to vote are surely relevant to thinking about the meaning
of the right to vote. But questions of statutory interpretation are ordina-
rily resolved through examination of the text of the statute and its legisla-
tive history. Guinier never actually connects the theories of the civil
rights movement with the actions or intent of Congress. She does not
discuss the extent to which Congress shared the movement's expansive
definition of the meaning of voting or intended to enact it when it
adopted the Act and its amendments. 118 Surely, there was opposition to
the movement's vision in Congress, and Congress might have given the
movement much less than it sought. For the movement's vision to deter-
mine the meaning of the Act, Guinier would have to show that Congress
intended to codify it in the Act, and she has not done so.119 At times
Guinier treats the Act not as a matter of positive law but as a metaphor for
a perfected democracy for minorities.
Even if the civil rights movement's vision informs our interpretation
of the Act, the connection between the right to vote and the advance-
ment of a substantive political agenda remains ambiguous, with at least
three possible meanings. 120 First, it could be that proponents of the Act
saw the right to vote as a foot in the door, an essential prerequisite to the
pursuit of a political agenda, a "foundational" right that made subsequent
political action possible, but not that the right to vote carries with it an
entitlement to political success. Second, it could be that the proponents
assumed, as a predictive matter, that the right to vote would lead to polit-
ical empowerment and the enactment of a political agenda.121 But the
presumption of political success does not engender an entitlement to suc-
118. One proviso, added in 1982, states that "nothing" in section 2 "establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). If Congress inserted into the Act an express
rejection of a right to proportional representation in elections, it is doubtful that Congress
intended to embrace a right to proportionate legislative outcomes.
119. It is not clear whether Guinier believes her analysis of the Act and her specific
proposals follow from the actions of Congress, or rather, whether she is seeking to read
broader normative concerns into the Act. At one point Guinier flatly declares that her
"focus and basic remedial approach . . . has been mandated by Congress" (p. 115).
Elsewhere, she states that her proposals are not mandated by Congress at all, but rather
"borrow[ ] from the themes that have been the subject of the debate surrounding the 1965
Act and especially its 1982 Amendments" (p. 279 n.79) (see also p. 109 "nor do I argue that
these proposals are statutorily or constitutionally required").
120. As Samuel Issacharoff has noted, "[t]he normative outcomes of full political
equality have been uncertain since the founding strokes of the modem civil rights
movement." Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833, 1870 (1992).
121. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 582, 585 (1969) ("[T]he action
taken by Congress... proceeded on the premise that once Negroes had gained free access
to the ballot box, state governments would then be suitably responsive to their voice, and
federal intervention would not bejustified.") (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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cess; it could simply mean the Act's supporters underestimated the polit-
ical obstacles that lay ahead. Third, it could be that the right to vote was,
indeed, understood to include all the political steps necessary to the ef-
fectuation of a political agenda, so that simple majority voting in the legis-
lature ought to be treated as a practice that abridges the right to vote
when it prevents the implementation of the minority's political agenda.
This interpretation of the Act is surely in tension with principles of feder-
alism recently invoked by the Supreme Court in interpreting the Act.
1 22
Moreover, this reading comes close to treating the Act as the source of an
entitlement to substantive outcomes, and Guinier has insisted that her
vision of the Act is procedural and not substantive.
Indeed, the latter point may be the nub of the matter. The Voting
Rights Act is essentially about process. As Samuel Issacharoff has noted,
"[v]oting rights law can be defined by its strong element of process cor-
rection .... That element of process correction separates voting rights
claims from the purely outcome-driven civil rights claims against the dis-
tribution of goods and opportunities in this society." 123 The successes of
voting rights litigation in enfranchising minorities and reforming the
rules for electing representatives reflects the appeal of process-based ar-
guments in our legal culture. As Issacharoff points out, "voting rights
claims gather force to the extent that process-based claims can relieve a
conservative judiciary of any obligation to police the substantive distribu-
tional outcomes of the policy decisions of elected political bodies."
24
Guinier attempts to conform her proposal to the process-correction
focus of the Act by arguing that legislative vote dilution litigation would
be "procedural and not substantive," and have "nothing to do with the
substance of state and local deliberative processes" (p. 115). The focus in
a legislative vote dilution case would be "on discrimination in the distri-
bution of procedural resources such as votes, not on the specific out-
comes of public policy debates" (p. 104). Indeed, she insists her ap-
proach differs from traditional forms of judicial review of legislative
action, which "typically focused on the need to monitor and constrain the
substantive outputs of the decisionmaking process" (p. 103). Instead, for
Guinier, " [t] he issue here is one of procedure and process, not substan-
tive justice" (p. 187).
This insistence that legislative vote dilution is a matter of process not
substance and concerned with rules not outcomes, however, is not per-
suasive. Legislative vote dilution litigation would require close scrutiny of
legislative outcomes-of "policy outputs" (p. 14) -since outcomes would
be "relevant ... as evidence whether the decisionmaking process is fair"
(p. 249 n.64). The evaluation of legislative outcomes would, inevitably,
entail substantive assessments of legislative decisions. Whereas in "second
122. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 832 (1992).
123. Issacharoff, supra note 120, at 1865.
124. Id. at 1869.
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generation" litigation, the determination of the success of the minority in
electing representatives relative to the minority's share of the population
and the size of the legislature requires a relatively straightforward numeri-
cal calculation, the assessment of minority success in the enactment of
legislation is likely to be more difficult and entail "unbridled normative
assessments of politics."' 25 Courts or the Department of Justice would
have to decide which issues were of "importance to the minority"-a
complicated enterprise when the issues are not clearly racial but inter-
twined with social welfare programs, the distribution of jobs, and the
quality of public services. At least as difficult would be the determination
of the relative weight to be given to different bills, since not all legislative
victories are of equal importance. Indeed, there would, no doubt, be dif-
ficulties in determining whether a particular bill ought to be counted as a
success or failure for the minority since many bills are the product of
compromise and can simultaneously provide a benefit and limit that
benefit.
Legislative vote dilution cases would place the local legislative pro-
cess on the witness stand. The assessment of legislative outcomes would
require a close examination of the content of the bills, the preferences of
the minority representatives, the extent to which those bills advanced the
minority's agenda, and the relative success of the minority compared to
what the minority should have obtained based on the sense of some
outside reviewer-a federal court or the Department of Justice-of what
the minority would have obtained in a fair political process. Scrutiny of
the outcomes as evidence of the process could become scrutiny of the
outcomes for their substantive fairness-as measured by the outside re-
viewer's sense of fairness. At this point, substance and process would be
deeply entangled.
Beyond the technical difficulties of assessing the outcomes "evi-
dence," the underlying theory of legislative vote dilution litigation has a
strong substantive cast. As Guinier puts it, her "conceptual claim" is that
each group protected by the Act "has a right to have its interests satisfied a
fair proportion of the time" (p. 104) (emphasis added). A legislative vote
dilution case would "measure deviations from an ideal proportional
power share to determine gross interest representation disparities" (p.
106). But a right to the satisfaction of interests and the standard of a
proportionate share of victories (not just proportionate share of repre-
sentatives) are substantive principles. They are entirely focused on out-
comes and are concerned not with how decisions are made, but with their
content. They address not how collective preferences ought to be calcu-
lated but which preferences ought to be enacted. Even if not concerned
with the outcomes of specific bills, these principles are focused on legisla-
tive outcomes in the aggregate. The underlying conceptual and legal
125. Samuel Issacharoff, The Elusive Quest forJudicial Review of Political Fairness, 71
Tex. L. Rev. 1643, 1677 (1993).
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claim is not a matter of process and procedure, but of substantive justice.
Legislative vote dilution litigation would be inextricably intertwined with
the substance of legislative decisionmaking. It would mix substance and
process, inviting close judicial or Justice Department review of the fair-
ness of the outcomes, as well as the voting rules, of state and local legisla-
tive activity. It does not fit easily within the ambit of the Voting Rights Act
or, more generally, within a theory of process-based reform of state and
local government.
Indeed, the primary effect of legislative vote dilution litigation would
be the circumvention of the Supreme Court's decision to apply an "in-
tent" rather than an "effects" test in racial discrimination cases under the
equal protection clause. 126 Given the pervasive interaction of race with
economic and social differences, an "effects" test could have led to strict
judicial scrutiny of many government spending and regulatory programs
that, as a statistical matter, differentially benefit or burden people of dif-
ferent races. The "effects" test thus could have promoted the greater pro-
portionality of government action. Fearing just this close judicial over-
sight of the vast array of state and local decisions, the Court rejected the
effort to graft the "effects" test into substantive equal protection law.
Through the theory of legislative vote dilution, Guinier would resurrect
the "effects" test, only this time as a matter of fair process. But whatever
the wisdom of the Supreme Court's reading of the Equal Protection
Clause and its rejection of the "effects" test, surely the notion of propor-
tionality of legislative outcomes is more one of fair substance than of fair
process.
2. Do Guinier's Remedies for Legislative Vote Dilution Work? - Even if
legislative majority rule is treated as a "standard, practice, or procedure"
within the Voting Rights Act,' 27 it is not clear there is a procedural solu-
tion that would remedy legislative vote dilution and promote what
Guinier describes as the black political agenda, without the sort of close
outside monitoring that is in sharp tension with the notion of local self-
government.
Consistent with the analogy to electoral vote dilution, Guinier's prin-
cipal remedy for legislative vote dilution is cumulative voting-in the leg-
islature. "[O]ver a period of time and a series of legislative proposals,
votes on multiple bills would be aggregated or linked.... [B]lack repre-
sentatives could ... participate in the legislative process [by] plumping
votes to express the intensity of constituent preferences on some issues
and trading votes on issues of constituent indifference" (p. 108). Like
electoral cumulative voting, then, legislative cumulative voting would al-
low the minority to prevail on some percentage of legislative votes even in
the face of unified majority opposition.
126. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-49 (1972).
127. Voting Rights Act of 1965 §§ 2, 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (1988).
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Legislative cumulative voting, however, is of doubtful workability.
Cumulative voting for the election of representatives relies on a determi-
nate number-known in advance-of seats to be filled. In an election
for a five-member body, there are five seats, voters have five votes per
person, and each voter can cumulate up to five votes for one candidate.
In the legislature, however, there is no determinate number of bills or
legislative votes known at the outset of a legislative session. Many bills can
have an almost infinite number of permutations, as amendments are ad-
ded, clauses dropped, modifications made, exceptions inserted, exclu-
sions then made from the exceptions, provisions carved out and placed in
separate bills, and previously separate bills combined into an omnibus
bill. Similarly, there can be an almost infinite number of votes-on the
amendments, on the rules governing debate, on motions to cut off de-
bate, on motions to table, on motions to recommit to committee, on mo-
tions to move the previous question, or on motions to reconsider. There
is no way of knowing in advance how many votes will be cast during a
legislative session as a whole, on any topic, or for any group of bills. Cu-
mulative voting requires a fixed number of votes to cumulate, but in legis-
lative deliberations there will not be a fixed number of votes. Thus, legis-
lative cumulative voting is not feasible without some outside monitor
regularly selecting and linking specific issues or votes for cumulation.
But that would entail the considerable ongoing external involvement in
legislative decisionmaking which Guinier is seeking to avoid.
The problems with legislative supermajority voting are somewhat
different. Guinier presents two versions of a possible supermajority rem-
edy-one focused "on issues of importance to the majority or its
equivalent, a minority veto on critical minority issues" (p. 108),128 and
128. Actually, these are not equivalents. The minority veto would give the minority
far more power. With a supermajority rule, the majority group in the legislature could pass
its legislation by combining a unanimous majority group with a fraction of the minority. In
a nine-member council, with five whites and four blacks, and a two-thirds voting rule, five
whites and one black could pass legislation over the opposition of the other three blacks.
But a minority veto implies that the consent of a majority of the minority would be
necessary for enactment, so that as few as two negative votes of the black members would
be sufficient to block enactment of a measure supported by five whites and two blacks.
A minority veto would resemble the rule of concurrent majorities made famous (or
notorious) by John C. Calhoun in A Disquisition on Government. See John C. Calhoun, A
Disquisition on Government and a Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the
United States (Columbia, S.C., Richard K. Cralle ed. 1851). Like Guinier, Calhoun saw a
community "as made up of different and conflicting interests," id. at 28, and was
concerned about the consequent danger of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent such
majoritarian abuse, he would "require the consent of each interest," id. at 25, as a
condition for government action. This would make it "impossible for any one interest or
combination of interests or class, or order, or portion of the community, to obtain
exclusive control." Id. at 25-26. The concurrent majority would "give to each interest or
portion of the community a negative on the others." Id. at 35. That, in turn, would
require the majority to take the interests of the minority into account and would promote
the spirit of compromise within the community. See id. at 36, 66, 69; see also George
Kateb, The Majority Principle: Calhoun and His Antecedents, 84 Pol. Sci. Q. 583, 595-97
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the other a "uniform decisional rule," "race-neutral," which would give
bargaining power "to all numerically inferior or less powerful groups, be
they black, female or Republican" (pp. 16-17). Special voting rules
based on the "race" of the issue are also of doubtful workability. First, it
will be difficult to determine in advance what issues are of importance to
particular racial groups. Some of the issues Guinier cites-assistance to
the poor, social welfare spending, a broader role for government in gen-
eral-are not racial per se, but are intertwined with questions of econom-
ics, class, ideology, and morality. Without an obvious racial marker, it is
not clear which issues will require a supermajority voting rule and which
can be decided by a simple majority. This difficulty might be overcome
by an outside agency-a court or the Department of Justice-requiring
special votes on particular issues, but again that would involve considera-
ble ongoing external involvement in the inner workings of a legislature.
Second, the use of special decisional rules for issues associated with a
racial minority would raise a constitutional question. The Supreme Court
has indicated concern "when the State allocates governmental power
nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to deter-
mine the decision making process."129 To be sure, this concern with allo-
cating political power according to the racial nature of the issue has, until
now, only arisen when the majority adopted special rules that made it
more-not less-difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legisla-
tion. 30 But the Court's current close scrutiny of race-conscious measures
intended to advance the representation of minorities' 3 ' suggests that
even a special voting rule specifically intended to make it easier to pass
legislation supported by racial minorities would be an inviting target for a
constitutional challenge.
By contrast, a general supermajority vote is quite feasible.
Supermajority requirements are common in democratic legislatures,
although they are usually reserved for issues of unusual importance, such
as amending the Constitution, ratifying a treaty, or overriding an execu-
tive veto.' 3 2 But a supermajority requiremeht may be of limited help to a
minority seeking government assistance. By making it harder for a legis-
(1969) (describing Calhoun's use of the concurrent majority requirement to protect
minorities from injustice).
Unlike Guinier, Calhoun also recognized that the concurrent majority requirement,
in departing from simple majority rule, would promote limited government (which he
desired) since it would make it more difficult for government to act. See Calhoun, supra,
at 59.
129. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982). See also
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1969) (holding that racial classifications bear
heavier burden of justification than other classifications).
130. See Washington, 458 U.S. at 457; Lee v. Nyquist, 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (holding
unconstitutional New York statute prohibiting state officials from assigning students for
purposes of achieving racial equality); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385.
131. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2817 (1993).
132. See, e.g., Joseph Jaconelli, Majority Rule and Special Majorities, 1989 Pub. L.
587, 603-06.
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lature to take action, supermajority voting rules can operate to protect
the interests of a minority if the minority's principal goal is to prevent
legislative action and preserve the status quo. 133 But Guinier is seeking
legislative action on a broad economic and social agenda. A rule that
promotes inaction may not be a particularly effective remedy for ob-
taining action.
To be sure, the power to block action is the power to win conces-
sions. A supermajority requirement could give minority voters a bargain-
ing chip in negotiations with the majority's representatives over some-
thing the majority wants. Indeed, Guinier likens her "remedial ideal" to
"the model of jury deliberations," where the requirement of unanimity
means not that any individual juror is able to secure a verdict based on
his or her personal preference but rather that each juror must be listened
to and each gets an effective opportunity to influence the outcome (pp.
107-08).1-3 But this assumes that the majority in a presumptively po-
larized legislature wants something strongly enough that it is willing to
overcome its prejudices and make concessions to the minority. In the
jury setting, each panel is uniquely focused on just one case, and the insti-
tutional pressure to resolve that case creates incentives to compromise-
and even in the jury settings deadlocks occur. The legislative setting is
quite different. Accepting Guinier's postulate that the principal policy
clash between blacks and whites in many states and localities will be over
social welfare spending, aiding the poor, the scope of government in-
volvement, and the taxes that go with an activist government, then a ma-
jority presumably content with the status quo and predisposed against
new government spending would in many cases actually prefer deadlock
to enactment of a progressive agenda. To be sure, there will be cases
where the polarized majority really wants something out of its state or
local government and might be willing to trade with the minority to
achieve it. But, in general, a supermajority voting requirement is an un-
certain instrument for extracting action out of a majority that is happier
with the status quo than the minority.
3. Implications for the Principle of "Taking Turns." - These objections
to Guinier's proposed remedies for legislative vote dilution also raise
doubts about the implementation of her more general goal of replacing
"winner-take-all" majority rule with the principle of "taking turns." For
her, the purpose of the "taking turns" principle is not just to give the
minority a few victories but, rather, to create an institutional setting in
133. The decision of the Republican-controlled House of Representatives in the 104th
Congress to amend the House's rules to require a supermajority of three-fifths of the
House in order to pass any bill that would increase personal or corporate income taxes was
obviously intended to make it more difficult for Congress to raise taxes. See supra note
114.
134. Interestingly, Calhoun also embraces thejury as his model for legislative decision
making. However, he notes that despite the unanimity requirement jurors do reach a
verdict because they are empaneled under circumstances in which "something must be
done." Calhoun, supra note 128, at 65-66.
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which the majority is willing to listen to the minority and to seek its coop-
eration. "Taking turns" could make government more deliberative, more
attentive to the entire constituency, and, thus, more democratic.
But apart from her discussion of potential remedies under the Vot-
ing Rights Act for legislative vote dilution, Guinier does not attend to the
practical problems of implementing the principle of "taking turns." The
only one of Guinier's remedies that was framed to promote "taking turns"
directly-legislative cumulative voting-is probably unworkable. The
other remedies resemble the traditional political devices that protect the
minority by limiting the majority; they do not provide the minority with
any specific power to pass legislation, or "take a turn." Supermajority vot-
ing will empower the minority only when the majority wants something
enough that it is willing to deal with the minority, but Guinier's underly-
ing assumptions of racial polarization and differences in preferences with
respect to government activism suggest that a supermajority rule is likely
to result less in "taking turns" and more in deadlock-or no turns at all.
Thus, implementing "taking turns" by litigation or by imposed
changes in legislative decisional rules risks either deadlock or the kind of
close outside monitoring by external agencies that is deeply at odds with
self-government. That does not mean that a "taking turns" version of ma-
jority rule is necessarily a utopian dream-although it very well may be-
but merely that litigation under the Voting Rights Act may not be the way
to do it.
We need to engage in more comparative research, and especially, to
give closer study to "consensus democracies" in which "the guiding prin-
ciple.., is to achieve the explicit consent of the major social groups in
the country." 3 5 A particularly interesting phenomenon, noted by polit-
ical scientist Arend Lijphart, is the pattern in a number of democratic
countries of "oversized cabinets," that is, coalition governments contain-
ing more parties than are strictly necessary to form a majority and thereby
providing representation to significant minorities. 36 "Oversized cabi-
nets," he notes, "are more typical of the consensus model, and they are
particularly suitable for governing plural societies."13 7 We need to know
more about how democracies become "consensus" oriented rather than
"majoritarian," how decisionmaking in such countries actually proceeds
and just what "consensus" means in these countries, whether deadlock is
a problem, and whether practices designed to promote consensus are the
product of legal rules or broader social and political agreements.
I suspect that any implementation of the principle of "taking turns"
that would also respect traditions of state and local self-government 'and
legislative autonomy can only come from within the political process and
cannot be imposed from outside or through litigation. This may be the
135. Dahl, supra note 15, at 156.
136. See Lijphart, supra note 16, at 46-66.
137. Id. at 62.
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real lesson to be drawn from the model of collective action that appears
to have inspired Guinier's principle of shared decisionmaking: the family
(p. 5). According to Guinier,
family decision making ...utilizes a taking-turns approach.
When parents sit around the kitchen table deciding on a vaca-
tion destination or activities for a rainy day, often they do not
simply rely on a show of hands, especially if that means that the
older children always prevail or if affinity groups among the
children.., never get to play their activity of choice. Instead of
allowing the majority simply to rule, the parents may propose
that everyone take turns, going to the movies one night and
playing video games the next. (Pp. 5-6.)
But, of course, "taking turns" in a family is not imposed by law from
without but emerges from within, both reflecting and reinforcing norms
of trust, reciprocity, and mutual commitment to overarching shared ends.
Translated to the public arena, the principle of "taking turns" would,
thus, be less a cure for the pathology of polarized legislatures, and more
the healthy end-state of a polity that has taught itself to deal with its inter-
nal differences. This, of course, tells us nothing about how to get to a
polity marked by consensus and power-sharing rather than winner-take-
all majority rule. Indeed, it suggests that the rules that would implement
the principle of taking turns are likely to be useless without a broader
political commitment to the principle in the first place.
Still, the comparative research that may help us to determine
whether "taking turns" majority rule works, how societies come to adopt
it, and the role of legal rules in promoting such an approach to legislative
decisionmaking has yet to be done, and could shed light on how to pro-
mote greater majority-minority power-sharing without either excessive ex-
ternal interference or deadlock.
C. Majority Rule and Racial Polarization
Although I am not persuaded by Guinier's effort to read a theory of
legislative vote dilution into the Voting Rights Act, she has, nonetheless,
made a valuable point in emphasizing the nexus between the right to vote
and legislative outcomes. Although in a representative system, legislative
outputs do not fall within the anibit of the right to vote, the two are con-
nected. Voting is not simply a matter of idiosyncratic political expression
unrelated to government decisionmaking. The purpose of the right to
vote, indeed, the meaning of the vote, is to give people an opportunity to
affect the substance of government. 38 The right to vote is "a fundamen-
tal matter in a free and democratic society"13 9 because it is the key way
138. Cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct 2059 (1992) (rejecting claim of constitutional
right to cast write-in ballot where write-in could not affect outcome of election).
139. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
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most people can participate in governance.' 40 If, due to other features of
the political process, the votes of some people never have any impact on
government, then it is difficult to say they are self-governing. The consis-
tent denial of the political preferences of a historically subordinated mi-
nority raises a profound problem for the legitimacy of a polity that claims
to be democratic.
Democracy assumes that all people have an equal right to participate
in their own governance. Guinier would use the Voting Rights Act to
reform racially polarized state and local legislatures, to bring them into
compliance with the underlying norm of political equality that legiti-
mates, and, indeed, defines democratic self-government. In that sense,
she is not anti-democratic, as some of her critics have contended, but
rather the "democratic idealist" (p. 14) that she claims to be. In seeking
to reform state and local governments, however, her legal theory and her
remedies would entail close review of the outputs of state and local legis-
latures by federal judges and administrators according to an indetermi-
nate and inevitably subjective standard of proportionality of outcomes. A
polarized and exclusionary legislature is inconsistent with democratic self-
government, but close oversight and correction by federal monitors to
implement an external definition of substantively fair outcomes is not
self-government at the state and local level either.
Guinier thus points us to a disquieting dilemma: how to reconcile
majority rule with substantive fairness in the presence of racial division?
The magnitude of that dilemma and the nature of the response require
consideration of the nature and scope of racial polarization in American
legislatures.
The concept of racial polarization does an enormous amount of
work in her analysis-and in voting rights jurisprudence generally-but
Guinier does not develop what racial polarization means within a legisla-
tive setting. Race is one of the fundamental divisions in our society, and
it affects political preferences and attitudes much as it affects so many
other things.14' Racially polarized voting within the electorate-defined
as the tendency for blacks and whites to vote for different candidates par-
ticularly in elections when candidates of different races are pitted against
each other-is a widespread and well-documented phenomenon.142 In
the electoral context, polarization is defined in terms of the correlation
140. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1708 (1993).
141. See, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile,
Unequal 199-219 (1992); see also Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, Issue
Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics 27-88 (1989) (describing
how divisions over race have shaped national competition between two major parties and
voters' perceptions of parties); Thomas B. Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The
Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (1991) (same).
142. See Issacharoff, supra note 120, at 1871.
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of race of voters with the votes for candidates, particularly in elections
when the leading candidates are of different races.
But how do we decide whether a legislature is racially polarized?
Two important issues will have to be addressed in transferring the analysis
of polarization from the electorate to the legislature. First, within the
legislative setting, what is the equivalent of the race of the candidate?
Guinier does not limit the analysis of legislative racial polarization to clas-
sic civil rights issues like anti-discrimination legislation, but would extend
it to a range of economic and social questions. She tends to assume, with-
out proving, that there are "white" or "black" positions on a range of
public questions not directly linked to questions traditionally defined as
racial. But the question is more difficult than that.
It is a sad truth that in many black-versus-white elections, a high pro-
portion of voters simply rally around the candidate of their own race.
The race of the candidate can take on enormous symbolic significance,
dominating the issues, overwhelming economic or ideological differences
among people of the same race, and simplifying the question of for
whom to vote.1 43 But when the voting concerns issues not candidates,
and when the issues lack a clear racial marker, how are we to decide
which issues indicate whether racially polarized voting is occurring? It is
not clear that we can rely on any correlation of the racial division among
legislators with votes on particular bills. As Guinier herself has pointed
out, particular legislators may not vote thepreferences or the interests of
people of their own race (pp. 13, 48). Nor is it clear that people of one
race will line up decisively on one side or the other of a particular bill the
way they tend to in elections between candidates of different races.
Intraracial differences, growing out of differences in class, sex, or
personal philosophy, and affecting such issues as levels of taxation, the
role of the government in regulating business or helping the needy, poli-
cies on crime, and questions of public morality, may be submerged in the
name of racial unity to elect a candidate of a particular race but may then
re-emerge when the issues themselves are expressly presented. 144
Although there tend to be general differences of opinion between blacks
and whites over a range of public issues, 145 the cleavages are not as sharp
and the nature of the disagreement is more nuanced than in black-versus-
143. See Nayda Terkildsen, When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The
Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 37 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 1032 (1993).
144. Cf. Swain, supra note 29, at 11-13 (noting differences in opinion between black
leadership organizations and "the rank-and-file black population" on range of questions,
especially issues of criminal justice); see also Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law,
and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1258-61 (1994) (noting
disagreements among African-Americans concerning criminal law enforcement policy).
145. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 29, at 10-11;Jennifer L. Hochschild & Monica Herk,
"Yes, But . . .": Principles and Caveats in American Racial Attitudes, in Chapman &
Wertheimer, supra note 109, at 308-25.
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white candidate elections. Nor is it clear how general differences on
questions of public policy map on specific legislative votes.
146
Second, in the study of electoral polarization, no effort is made to
attribute a causal role to race in voter decisionmaking. The correlation
of the race of the voter with electoral outcomes is enough to establish
polarization. Should polarization be defined the same way within the leg-
islature, despite the differences in popular and legislative voting, and the
far greater role that party affiliation, ideology, constituent and contribu-
tor demands-not to mention cravings for power and recognition' 47-
play in the voting decisions of legislators relative to those of the general
electorate? In a legislature where the black and white representatives also
tend to belong to different parties or embrace different ideologies should
differences in votes be explained solely in terms of race without taking
into account party or ideology?
As previously noted, Guinier sends out conflicting signals concern-
ing her sense of the extent of legislative polarization. In emphasizing
that "third generation" voting rights litigation could be mounted only in
cases of proven polarization, she implies that such litigation would be
limited to a relative handful of pathological settings. If so, the Voting
Rights Act-amended to establish its application to legislative decision-
making-might be an appropriate tool for placing these polarized and
exclusionary legislatures into a sort of federal receivership. Intrusive rem-
edies might be justified for a handful of highly diseased local polities.
But if, instead, as she sometimes states, the United States as a whole is "a
racially divided society" (p. 5), with legislative polarization, 48 then fed-
eral intervention in state and local governments could become the norm
and state and local self-government largely displaced. This ambiguity
may have been a source of concern to President Clinton when he ex-
pressed misgivings about Guinier's proposals as "general remedies."
49
This, then, is the great conundrum at the heart of Guinier's argu-
ment. Racial polarization within state and local legislatures can nullify
the Voting Rights Act's proscription of racial discrimination in voting;
146. See Paul M. Sniderman & Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race 8-12 (1993)
(contending that there are three sets of racial issues in contemporary politics-a "social
welfare agenda," an "equal treatment agenda," and a "race-conscious agenda"-and that
different groups of whites have different views on each cluster of racial issues).
147. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of
the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
80-106 (1990).
148. For example, Guinier speaks of "the documented persistence of racial
polarization," and of how "racism excludes minorities from ever becoming part of the
governing coalition" (p. 103). She continues, "[T]he primary accomplishment" of the
second generation of voting rights litigation "has been to effect cosmetic changes in the
composition of state and local decisionmaking bodies... [which] has simply transferred
the discrete and insular minority problem from the electorate to the legislative body" (p.
117).
149. See supra text accompanying note 9.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
moreover, a polarization that consistently denies blacks a fair opportunity
to satisfy their political preferences strips those polities of their demo-
cratic pretensions. In such a setting, majority rule may be majority tyr-
anny, and a commitment to the values that legitimate democracy would
support intervention to rewrite local legislative voting rules on behalf of
the minority. Federal law could deal with state and local legislative polari-
zation if it occurred in only a relative handful of places. But if polariza-
tion is widespread, then external scrutiny of the legislative outputs and
procedures of large numbers of states and localities is ultimately inconsis-
tent with principles of state and local self-government.
To resolve this dilemma we need to know more about how state and
local legislatures work and to think more about the meaning of racial
polarization within the legislature. Paradoxically, the less pervasive racial
polarization is found to be, the more persuasive is Guinier's call for some
federal intervention to reform the inner workings of the most pathologi-
cal jurisdictions and to bring them into compliance with the basic criteria
of democratic self-governance. But if polarization is epidemic in Ameri-
can state and local legislatures, as her rhetoric sometimes suggests, then
her solution would result in a widespread federalization of state and local
legislatures and arguably destroy local self-government in order to save it.
Indeed, if the problem is as severe as she suggests, it is not clear that
there is any procedural remedy or institutional reform likely to be
adopted that can make much difference.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have considered The Tyranny of the Majority primarily
from the perspective of democratic political theory. Despite the charge of
"anti-democratic" flung at her during the battle over her nomination,
Guinier's concern with majority tyranny reflects a longstanding theme in
democratic theory, much as she draws on the Madisonian strain in Ameri-
can thought in searching for procedural cures for political problems. But
democratic theory rarely makes headlines or the evening news. As the
firestorm of controversy that engulfed Guinier's nomination indicates,
for many people the real issue raised by Guinier's work is the question of,
and the discomfort with, the role of race in contemporary American
politics.
Guinier's work is literally "race-conscious": A basic premise of the
articles collected in The Tyranny of the Majority is that race is a highly sali-
ent factor in American politics, and that race ought to be taken into ac-
count in the design of American political institutions. She assumes that
Americans frequently divide along racial lines in their views about public
policy, in the voting booth, and in state and local legislatures. I suspect
that her candor about the role of race in politics explains much of the
opposition that she drew, even though there is considerable support for
her premise with respect to electoral behavior and public opinion.
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Nearly three decades of voting rights litigation have demonstrated
that there is a significant correlation between race and popular voting.150
So, too, public opinion research indicates a nexus between race and atti-
tudes on a range of political and social issues.' 51 This is not to embrace
the view, recently denounced by Justice Thomas, "that members of the
racial group must think alike and that their interests are so distinct that
the group must be provided a separate body of representatives in the
legislature to voice its unique point of view."152 Race does not mechani-
cally determine political viewpoint, and many individuals certainly cross
"racial lines" and vote for candidates of another race. But over the course
of numerous elections over several decades, when individual decisions
are aggregated together it turns out that race consistently has had a pow-
erful role in explaining political outcomes.' 53 Some racial division is,
thus, a basic fact of American political life, although, as I have indicated,
the definition, scope, and significance of racial polarization within legisla-
tures is far more uncertain.
Can racial division be taken into account in the design of our polit-
ical institutions without thereby hardening and perpetuating such racial
division? Ironically, given the opposition that greeted her nomination,
the most striking aspect of Guinier's work is her effort to develop reme-
dies that can address racial division without formally building race into
the structure of politics.
The centerpiece of Guinier's political reform agenda is the use of
cumulative voting to elect legislative representatives. Part of the appeal
of cumulative voting is that although it would enhance the capacity of
racial minorities to elect candidates of their choice, cumulative voting is
formally race-neutral. It can facilitate the election of minority representa-
tives if, in fact, voters cast their ballots on racial lines. But cumulative
voting does not assume that voting is race-based, it does not assure the
election of racial minority representatives, and it does not lock in race,
or, indeed, any other factor, as the principal political dividing line in a
community. Cumulative voting and other alternatives to single-member
districts vindicate the representation of minorities in general, not racial
minorities in particular.
Even in her critique of legislative voting, Guinier struggled to
recharacterize the issue in terms not of racial conflict but of the general
unfairness of "winner-take-all" majority rule, and of the ability of the "tak-
150. See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia, in Quiet Revolution in the South:
The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990, at 84-86 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman, eds. 1994) (discussing polarized voting in Georgia); Orville V. Burton et al.,
South Carolina in Quiet Revolution, supra, 212-13 (discussing racial bloc voting in South
Carolina).
151. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 29, at 10-11; Hochschild & Herk, supra note 145,
308-325.
152. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2599 (1994).
153. See Issacharoff, supra note 120, at 1871.
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ing turns" principle to empower all minorities. But in seeking to imple-
ment remedies for legislative vote dilution, Guinier turned to solutions
that entail either a highly race-conscious approach to legislative decision-
making or a general supermajority rule with the attendant risk of legisla-
tive stalemate. It was just these proposals that provoked the most heated
opposition during the storm over her nomination. Indeed, in her more
recent work, Guinier appears to have dropped her call for a "third gener-
ation" of Voting Rights Act litigation and, instead, to have narrowed her
focus to promoting cumulative voting as the alternative to race-conscious
districting.'5
4
As this book demonstrates, Lani Guinier is a creative, thoughtful,
and articulate voice in the ongoing national argument over race and rep-
resentation. Her search for electoral systems and voting rules that will
widen the scope for effective participation by the many contending
groups within our society without either sharpening lines of division or
blocking the potential for political action on a range of pressing eco-
nomic and social concerns is of central importance, even if not all of her
proposals are persuasive. Given the range of ideas she has already
presented, Guinier is certain to be a significant contributor to the evolv-
ing debate about the nature and design of democracy in a demographi-
cally diverse polity for years to come.
Indeed, the ideological and partisan furor that blocked her nomina-
tion in the spring of 1993 appears to have had a significant, if unin-
tended, consequence. In losing her bid to be assistant attorney general
for civil rights, Guinier gained national attention and a broader, more
public audience for work that had been written primarily for academics.
F. Scott Fitzgerald famously observed, "there are no second acts in Ameri-
can lives." 155 With the publication of this book, Lani Guinier may prove
him wrong.
154. See Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy- The Voting Rights Cases, 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 109 (1994).
155. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Last Tycoon 189 (1941).
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